JASUBHAI LILABHAI PATEL v. KAMLESHBHAI JASUBHAI PATEL

C/CRA/149/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/11/2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD R/CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 149 of 2025 With CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2025 In R/CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 149 of 2025 ========================================================== JASUBHAI LILABHAI PATEL Versus KAMLESHBHAI JASUBHAI PATEL & ANR.

========================================================== Appearance:

MR.SUBHASH G BAROT(2619) for the petitioner(s) No. 1 MR MANISH S SHAH(5859) for the Opponent(s) No. 1,2 ========================================================== CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI

Date : 18/11/2025

ORAL ORDER

1. By way of this petition under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short “the Code”), the pe titioner prays to quash and set aside order dated 9.12.2024 passed by the learned Principal Civil Judge & JMFC at Vadali, Sabarkantha in Regular Civil Suit No.2 of 2024 below Exh.9 and further be pleased to allow application 2led by the petitioner before the learned trial Court under the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code and to reject the plaint.

2. Brief facts of the case are as under:- 2.1 The petitioner is defendant, and the respondents are the plainti9s in the suit, they have 2led suit against petitioner for compensation for defamation.

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C/CRA/149/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/11/2025 2.2 Present petitioner 2led complaint alleged to hav e been bogus against the plainti9s u/s 406, 420, 467, 468, 504, 506(2), 114 of the IPC being Criminal Case No.560 of 2018 2.3 The trial Court, after recording evidence acquit ted the plainti9s. Having found acquittal in Criminal Case , the plainti9s pleaded that malicious prosecution has be en launched against them by the petitioner defendant. Thus, the plainti9s 2led suit for compensation of alleged defamation and launch of malicious prosecution.

2.4 The order of acquittal was challenged by the pre sent petitioner before this court by way of 2ling Crimin al Appeal and an application for leave to appeal.

2.5 The application 2led by the petitioner for leave to appeal was allowed and appeal against the order of acquitt al of the plainti9s is admitted.

2.6 The suit has been 2led on the ground of malicious prosecution on alleged defamation of the plainti9s.

2.7 The petitioner submitted an application under th e provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 on the grounds that n o real cause of action has arisen as well as the suit is time barred.

2.8 Said application 2led by the petitioner is dismi ssed by the learned trial court.

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C/CRA/149/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/11/2025 2.9 Hence, present petition.

3. Parties are referred to as per their original sta tus before the lower Court.

4. Heard learned advocate Mr. SG Barot for the petiti oner.

Vide order dated 1.4.2025, learned advocate Mr. Manish Shah had instruction to appear for the respondents. However, today, when the matter is called out, he has chosen not to remain present.

5. Learned advocate for the petitioner would assail the impugned order and submit that the learned trial Co urt has committed serious error in rejecting the application 2led under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. He would furthe r submit that the suit is hopelessly time barred, as stateme nt made in the plaint is hit by law of limitation and yet the learned trial Court erroneously declined to hold that the suit is not barred by law of limitation. He would further submit that according to the plaint, the respondents – plainti9s 2led suit for damages of defamation. The defamation according to the plainti9s took place when Criminal Case No.560 of 2 018 for the o9ences punishable u/s 406, 420, 467, 468, 504, 506(2), 114 of the IPC was falsely registered against the plainti9s. He would further submit that the process in the criminal case was issued by the JMFC, Vadali and subsequently, framed the charges on 16.10.2019 and therefore, if the charges are framed false against the plainti9s, the cause of ac tion to 2le the suit for damages commenced from 16.10.2019. Ho wever, the suit was 2led subsequent thereto beyond the per iod of Page 3 of 13 C/CRA/149/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/11/2025 limitation of three years, in the year 2024, itself is a suit 2led beyond limitation. He would further submit that th erefore, present petition deserves consideration. He would further submit that the suit was lacking real and genuine c ause of action as well as suit was barred by law of limitat ion. It is further argued that all these issues have not been addressed by the learned trial Court in its proper perspectiv e. He would further submit that the suit for defamation itself is not maintainable as acquittal order has been challenged before the learned appellate Court and the leave to appeal has been granted by the Division Bench of this Court on 28.1.2024 permitted the petitioner to 2le acquittal appeal ag ainst Criminal Case No.560 of 2018.

5.1 Thus, it is submitted that in absence of real ca use of action and the plaint on its face since is time bar red, the learned trial Court ought to have rejected the plaint in exercise of jurisdiction under O 7 R 11(d) of the Code.

5.2 Upon above submissions, learned advocate Mr. Barot requests to allow this petition.

6. The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court u/s 115 of the Code has been elaborately discussed by the Hon’ ble Apex Court in case of Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v.

Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapat, 1969 (2) SCC 74 , wherein, it has been observed as under:- “Now when the aid of the High Court is invoked on the revisional side it is done because it is a supe rior court and it can interfere for the purpose of rectifying Page 4 of 13 C/CRA/149/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/11/2025 the error of the court below. Section 115 of the Cod e of Civil Procedure circumscribes the limits of that jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the statute; basically and fundamentally it is t he appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense. We do not, therefore, consider that the principle of merger of orders of inferior courts in those of superior Courts would be a’ected or would become inapplicable by making a distinction between a petition for revision and an appeal. (Emphasis supplied).”

7. In Yunus Ali (Dead) Through His L.Rs. Versus Khursheed Akram, 2008 AIR (SC) 2607 in regards to power u/s 115 of the Code, the Hon’ble Apex Court o bserved thus:- “It is well-settled position in law that u/s. 115 o f the Code of Civil Procedure the High Court cannot re- appreciate the evidence and cannot set aside the concurrent .ndings of the Courts below by taking a di’erent view of the evidence. The High Court is empowered only to interfere with the .ndings of fac t if the .ndings are perverse or there has been a non - appreciation or non-consideration of the material evidence on record by the courts below. Simply because another view of the evidence may be taken is no ground by the High Court to interfere in its revisional jurisdiction.”

8. Thus, the revisional power vested with the High C ourt is to examine that whether the learned Tribunal (a) ha ve exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted Page 5 of 13 C/CRA/149/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/11/2025 in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Essentially, the revisional jurisdiction castes responsibility on the higher forum to keep the Cour t below within limitation of law. The High Court is empowered only to interfere with the 2ndings of fact if the 2ndings a re perverse or there has been a non-appreciation or non-conside ration of the material evidence on record by the courts below . Simply because another view of the evidence may be taken i s no ground by the High Court to interfere in its revisional jurisdiction. [See: Masjid Kacha Tank, Nahan Versus Tu2ail Mohammed, AIR 1999 SC 455].

9. Considering the scope of the revisional jurisdict ion, if we examined the issues raised in this petition by the petitioner, mainly, it is contended that the plaint lacks real cause of action; averments made under the title of cause of action is illusive and in absence of real and actual cause of action, the plainti9s’ suit for recovery of damages of Rs.10 la kh towards damage for the defamation was totally illusive. It is apposite to note that the cause of action is a bundle of plaint, which are required to be pleaded and proved for the purpose o f obtaining relief claimed in the suit. In order to see that whether cause of action is pleaded, the Court has t o look to the averments in the plaint in their entirety to se e whether plaint discloses a cause of action. Elaborate enquiry into doubtful or complicated question of fact or law is unnecessary.

10. Apt to note that Plaint is not liable to be reje cted on the ground that the facts disclosed will not prove a ca se. At this Page 6 of 13 C/CRA/149/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/11/2025 juncture, one more aspect needed consideration that the Court has to take into account documents 2led with the plaint in view of Order 7 Rule 14. [See: Liverpool and Lond on SP v M.V. Sea (2004)9 SCC 512].

11. In Sopan Sukhdeo vs. Asst. Charity Commissioner, (2004) 3 SCC 137, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:- “Order 7 rule 11 vests an independent right to the defendant to challenge the maintainability of the s uit.

Trial court can entertain the objection at any stag e of the suit and even before conclusion of trial. Filing of a written statement is not a condition precedent. As a matter of fact court will not look into the written statement either. Averments in the plaint are germane for disposal of the application. Court is bound to reject the plaint if it attracts any of th e in.rmities provided in Order 7 rule 11.”

12. Keeping in mind the aforesaid proposition of law , if we go through the pleadings of the plaint, it appears that the plainti9s in para 2 of the plaint, pleaded that false and frivolous criminal case was registered by the petitioner for the o9ences punishable u/s 406, 420, 467, 468, 504, 506 (2), 114 of the IPC against them. On 12.9.2023, the learned criminal Court after permitting both the parties to lead evi dence and hearing them, was pleased to acquit the plainti9s. The plainti9s claimed that they have been falsely impli cated in the criminal case and the implication of the plainti9s was with a view to downgrade their prestige in the society. T herefore, the plainti9s claimed that by 2ling false criminal case, the petitioner has launched malicious prosecution again st them.

A clear cause of action is pleaded by the plainti9s. There is no Page 7 of 13 C/CRA/149/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/11/2025 cavil that the defendant had 2led Criminal Case aga inst clear acquittal of the plainti9s recorded by the learned JMFC. In that circumstances, suit for compensation for malic ious prosecution is maintainable. Whether the plainti9s prove malicious prosecution or not, is case to be decided during trial, but it cannot be said that the plainti9s have no right, sue of cause of action to 2le suit does not arise.

13. The plainti9s were acquitted on 12.9.2023 and on 14.2.224, the plainti9s have 2led suit for compensa tion for malicious prosecution. The limitation to 2le the suit for compensation for malicious prosecution is governed by Article 74 of the Limitation Act, which reads as under:- Description of suits Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run For compensation for a malicious prosecution One year When the plainti9 is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated.

14. The time rom which period begin to run for 2ling the suit regarding compensation for malicious prosecution is when the plainti9 is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwi se terminated, the period of limitation is one year th erefrom. In the present case, the suit was 2led within one year from the date of acquittal in Criminal Case.

15. In Saleem Bhai v State of Maharashtra (2003)1 SCC 557, in reference to O 7 R 11 of the Code, the Hon’ble Apex Page 8 of 13 C/CRA/149/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/11/2025 Court held as under:- "9...the relevant facts which need to be looked int o for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court at any stage of the suit-before registering can exercise the power.

the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendan t at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under Clauses (a)

and (d) of rule 11 of Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at the stage..”

16. In Mayar (HK) Ltd. v Owners & Parties, Vessel MV Fortune (2006)3 SCC 100, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that averments in the plaint in its entirety taking them to be correct have to be considered to see whether plaint discloses a cause of action. It is substance and not the for m has to be looked into. Intention of the party has to be gathe red primarily from the tenor and terms of the pleading as a whole.

No pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat ju stice on hair-splitting technicalities. Piecemeal reading of plaint should not be made. Plaint has to be read as a whol e. In the aforesaid circumstances, according to this Court, t he suit by the plainti9s to recover the compensation or alleged malicious prosecution was 2led within one year from the date of the cause of action arose.

17. At the cost of repetition, it can be said that c ause of action arose on 12.9.2023. No sooner the plainti9s were acquitted from the Criminal Case, the suit was 2led on 14.2.2024. Thus, the suit was 2led within the time limit.

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C/CRA/149/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/11/2025 It is noticeable, despite clear right to sue exist and statement made in the plaint, reLects that suit is 2led withi n the time limit, according to this Court, the defendant 2led application before the learned trial Court and revision before this Court is misuse of legal procedure.

18. In the aforesaid circumstances, what could be no ticeable that 2ling of application under O 7 R 11 of the Cod e is a part of growing tendency to intercept and derail the sui t at initial stage under O 7 R 11 of the Code and to carry out t hem into revision without having any substance. It is to be said that this is an attempt by the petitioner to abuse the p rocess and such attempt is seriously eroded the sanctity of th e judicial process. The Court across the country is Looded wi th the litigation. Frivolous and groundless 2lings const itute a serious menace to the administration of justice. They consume time and clog of the infrastructure. Productive resources which should be deployed in the handling of genuine causes are dissipated in attending to cases 2led only to b ene2t from delay, by prolonging dead issues and pursuing worthless causes. This is complete fraudulent attempt on the part of the defendant to derail the proceedings of the suit.

19. After referring to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, the Division Bench of this Court in case of Parvin Cotgin Pvt Ltd. Versus Axis Bank Ltd., 2020 (4) GLH 145, imposed cost of Rs.10 lakh for 2ling frivolous li tigation.

Para 91 reads as under:-

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C/CRA/149/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/11/2025 “91. The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case, the contentions of the parties and th e law on the issue, as discussed by us in the paragraphs hereinabove, indicate the impetuous attitude of the appellants before us. As we have stated before, this is a typical instance of how the judicial system is getting clogged with frivolous litigation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in catena of cases that such frivolous and vexatious litigation must be discouraged by imposing exemplary costs or by adopting similar novel methods. The facts as they stand before us, leave us with no option, but to impose costs to the tune of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) on each of the appellants. We hope that the imposition of costs shall have a deterrent e’ect on all such litigants who have approached or attempt to approach the forums with such frivolous litigation.”

20. In Dnyandeo Sabji Naik and Another v. Pradnya Prakash Khadekar and Others, (2017) 5 SCC 496 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has, in its aureate enunciation, held thus:- “13. This Court must view with disfavour any attempt by a litigant to abuse the process. The sanctity of the judicial process will be seriously eroded if such attempts are not dealt with 2rmly. A litigant who takes liberties with the truth or with the procedures of the Court should be left in no doubt about the consequences to follow. Others should not venture along the same path in the hope or on a misplaced expectation of judicial leniency.

Exemplary costs are inevitable, and even necessary, in order to ensure that in litigation, a s in the law which is practise in our country, there is no premium on the truth.

14. Courts across the legal system-this Court not being an exception-are choked with litigation.

Frivolous and groundless 2lings constitute a serious menace to the administration of justice.

They consume time and clog the infrastructure.

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C/CRA/149/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/11/2025 Productive resources which should be deployed in the handling of genuine causes are dissipated in attending to cases 2led only to bene2t from delay, by prolonging dead issues and pursuing worthless causes. No litigant can have a vested interest in delay. Unfortunately, as the present case exempli2es, the process of dispensing justice is misused by the unscrupulous to the detriment of the legitimate. The present case is an illustration of how a simple issue has occupied the time of the courts and of how successive applications have been 2led to prolong the inevitable. The person in whose favour the balance of justice lies has in the process been left in the lurch by repeated attempts to revive a stale issue. This tendency can be curbed only if courts across the system adopt an institutional approach which penalises such behaviour. Liberal access to justice does not mean access to chaos and indiscipline. A strong message must be conveyed that courts of justice will not be allowed to be disrupted by litigative strategies designed to pro2t from the delays of the law.

Unless remedial action is taken by all courts here and now our society will breed a legal culture based on evasion instead of abidance. It is the dut y of every court to 2rmly deal with such situations.

The imposition of exemplary costs is a necessary instrument which has to be deployed to weed out, as wehras to prevent the 2ling of frivolous cases. It is only then that the courts can set apart time to resolve genuine causes and answer the concerns of those who are in need of justice. Imposition of rea l time costs is also necessary to ensure that access to courts is available to citizens with genuine grievances. Otherwise, the doors would be shut to legitimate causes simply by the weight of undeserving cases which Lood the system. Such a situation cannot be allowed to come to pass. Hence it is not merely a matter of discretion but a duty and obligation cast upon all courts to ensure that the legal system is not exploited by those who use the forms of the law to defeat or delay justice. We commend all courts to deal with frivolous 2lings in Page 12 of 13 C/CRA/149/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/11/2025 the same manner.”

21. Recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Haryana Urban Development Authority And Another Versus Jagdeep Singh, 2023 (14) SCC 122 , referring to the judgment in case of Dynandeo Sabaji Naik (supra), was pleased to award cost of Rs.50,000/- for 2ling frivolous litigation.

22. As observed herein above, the petition is 2led t o only to derail the proceedings of the civil suit on the whims and caprices of the defendant, which is clear abuse of process of law. Filing of such frivolous litigation is to be quanti2ed with the cost.

23. For the foregoing reasons, the petition fails an d stands dismissed with cost quanti2ed at Rs.7500/- to be de posited before the DLSA, Sabarkantha @ Himmatnagar within tw o weeks from the date of receipt of this order, faili ng which, the Collector, Sabarkantha is directed to recover the am ount of cost as arrears of revenue, upon receipt of request letter from the DLSA, Sabarkantha @ Himmatnagar. Notice discharged.

24. Consequently, CA does not survive and stands dis posed of accordingly.

(J. C. DOSHI,J)

SHEKHAR P. BARVE

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Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.

Digitally signed by: SHEKHAR PRAFULBHAI BARVE(HC00200), Principal Pvt. Secretary, at High Court of Gujarat on 21/11/2025 14:49:10