Phanjoubam Kula Meitei v. State of Manipur and 2 Others

Page 1 of 41

REPORTABLE

Sl. No. 5

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR

AT IMPHAL

WP(Crl.) No. 21 of 2026

Shri Phanjoubam Kula Meitei, aged about 58 years, F/o Shri Phanjoubam Rabi Meitei @ Luwangamba, a resident of Andro Lapaochum Tampak Leikai, Imphal East District, P.S.

Andro, District – Imphal East, Manipur – 795149.

….. Petitioner

-Versus-

1. The State of Manipur, represented by the Chief Secretary, Government of Manipur, Babupara, P.O. & P.S. Imphal, Imphal West District, Manipur, 795001.

2. The District Magistrate, Imphal East District, P.O. & P.S.

Porompat, Manipur – 795005.

3. The Union of India, through the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of Internal Security, North Block, New Delhi- 110001.

..... Respondents

BEFORE

HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M. SUNDAR

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE A. GUNESHWAR SHARMA

For Petitioner Mr. Ph. Sanajaoba along with Mr. RK Kulajit Singh, advocates

For respondent Nos. 1 &

2

Mr. S. Chit taranjan, Additional Advocate General, State of Manipur along with Mr. A.

Priyokumar Sharma, State Counsel.

For respondent No. 3 Mr. S. Vijayanand Sharma, Sr. PCCG (Senior Panel Counsel for Central Government)

Date of Judgment and

Order

12.09.2026

2026:MNHC:205-DB

Page 2 of 41

JUDGMENT AND ORDER

(ORAL)

[M. Sundar, CJ]

[1] The following abbreviations/short forms are used in this order for the sake of brevity/convenience and clarity:

Sl.

No.

Abbreviations/

Short Forms

Full Form/Expansion

1. WP Writ Petition

2. NSA National Security Act, 1980 (65 of 1980)

3. COFEPOSA the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (52 of 1974)

4. Act 14 the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug -Offenders, Forest-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (Act 14 of 1982)

5. UAPA Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967)

6. R1 first respondent

7. R2 second respondent

8. R3 third respondent

9. Detenu Phanjoubam Rabi Meitei @ Luwangamba, aged 28 years, S/o Ph. Kula Meitei of Andro Lapaochum Tampak Leikai, Andro PS, Imphal East District, Manipur (to be noted, Ph. Kula Meitei is the writ petitioner and father of detenu)

10. Impugned

preventive

detention order

order dated 21.04.2026 bearing reference No.

Cril/NSA/No.5 of 2026 made by R2 (detaining authority)

11. Impugned

approval orders

orders dated (i) 29.04.2026 bearing reference No. H -14/9/2026-HD-HD and (ii) 01.05.2026 bearing reference No. H-14/9/2026-HD-HD made by R1 12. Impugned confirmation order order dated 27.05.2026 bearing reference No.

H-14/9/2026-HD-HD made by R1

13. FIR First Information Report

14. FIRs First Information Reports

15. Sr.PCCG Senior Panel Counsel for Central Government 16. Addl.AG Additional Advocate General Page 3 of 41

[2] Captioned WP has been presented in this Court on 22.06.2026 seeking issue of a writ of habeas corpus assailing impugned preventive detention order made by R2, impugned approval orders made by R1 and impugned confirmation order (also) made by R1.

[3] Short facts (shorn of details and elaboration not imperative for appreciating instant order) are that the writ petitioner’s son (detenu) was arrested on 25.03.2026, produced in court and remanded on 26.03.2026 vide an FIR dated 08.04.2026 bearing No.

18(03)2026 APS on the file of Andro Police Station, Andro; that while the detenu was in judicial custody, R2 made the impugned preventive detention order inter-alia under Section 3 (2) of NSA, the same was served on the detenu the next day i.e., on 22.04.2026; that this was followed by grounds of detention made by R2 (detaining authority)

being grounds of detention dated 22.04.2026 and the grounds of detention was served on the detenu on 25.04.2026; that the detention order was approved by R1 inter-alia under Section 3(4) of NSA in and by impugned approval orders; that this was followed by confirmation order made by R1 under Section 12(1) of NSA i.e., impugned confirmation order; that as already alluded to supra, captioned WP was presented in this Court on 22.06.2026, notice was issued, R3 has filed an affidavit -in-opposition dated 07.07.2026, R2 has filed an affidavit-in-opposition dated 31.08.2026 and this affidavit-in- opposition has been adopted by R1.

Page 4 of 41

[4] In the hearing today, Mr. Ph. Sanajaoba along with Mr.

RK Kulajit, learned counsel on record for writ petitioner, Mr. S.

Chittaranjan, learned Additional Advocate General for State of Manipur along with Mr. A. Priyokumar Sharma, learned State Counsel for R1 and R2 and Mr. S. Vijayanand Sharma, learned Sr. PCCG for R3 were before this Court.

[5] Main WP was taken up and heard out with the consent of all the afore referred counsel.

[6] Notwithstanding myriad ground raised in the WP , learned counsel for writ petitioner predicated his campaign against the impugned preventive detention order, impugned approval orders and impugned confirmation order on 2 (two) points and these 2 (two)

points are as follows :

(i) The literacy level of detenu is II standard in school, he is not conversant with English, in and vide a communication dated 04.05.2026 made to the detaining authority (R2), detenu sought translation (translation in Manipuri language in Meitei Mayek script being the only language which detenu is conversant with) of the impugned detention order dated 21.04.2026, grounds of detention dated 22.04.2026 and documents adverted to in Page 5 of 41

grounds making it clear that he studied only upto II stands in school. Though this request was made to R2 vide communication dated 04.05.2026, R2 did not furnish copies for some time and ultimately after being requested to do so by Central Government (GoI) vide communication dated 14.05.2026 bearing reference No. II/15023/07/2026 -NSA, under cover of a letter dated 03.06.2026 (signed by Joint Secretary (Home), Government of Manipur) bearing reference No. H -14/9/2026- HD-HD translated copies of (only) the impugned preventive detention order dated 21.04.2026 and the grounds of detention dated 22.04.2024 (translation in Manipur Me itei Mayek script) was furnished but not even a single copy of the documents adverted to in the grounds {though as many as 11 (eleven)

documents have been adverted by way of

tabulation vide paragraph 29 of the grounds of detention} was translated and furnished . This has severely hampered the right of the detenu to make a representation much less an effective representation and has caused Page 6 of 41

infraction of sanctus right enshrined in Article 22(5) of the Constitution;

(ii) In the grounds of detention , more particularly in paragraph 35, after making it clear that the detenu has a right to make a representation s to Government of Manipur as well as Central Government against the impugned preventive detention order and after setting out the addresses to whom it should be sent detaining authority has fixed a cap with regard to time for sending the representations and has mentioned that the representation should be submitted within 3 (three) weeks from the date of detention. To be noted, in the instant case , date of detention (formal detention) pursuant to impugned preventive detention order was on 22.04.2026 as that is the date on which impugned preventive detention order was served on the detenu who remains incarcerated from 25.03.2026. This has again caused infraction of the right s of detenu enshrined in Article 22 (5) is learned counsel’s say. It was further pointed out that 3 (three) weeks from the date of detention elapsed on 13.05.2026 Page 7 of 41

but the translat ed copies of the preventive detention order and grounds alone (without documents) was furnished only on 03.06.2026 and therefore, the detenu could not make representations and he did not make representations as he very believed that he cannot make representations after elapsing of 3 (three) weeks from the date of detention i.e., after 13.05.2026 owing to the cap fixed in the grounds of detention.

[7] In response to the afore referred 2 (two) points, learned Addl. AG made submissions to the contrary and the same are as follows :

(i) The impugned preventive detention order and the grounds together with the documents were explained in a language known to the detenu and served on him on 22.04.2026 and 25.04.2026 . T herefore, it cannot be gainsaid that there is infraction of Article 22(5);

(ii) As regards the second point, it was submitted that it was open to the detenu to Page 8 of 41

make a representation even after 3 (three)

weeks.

[8] This Court carefully considered the afore referred 2 (two)

points i.e., the rival submissions. As regards the first point turning on translation/furnishing copies in regional language which alone detenu is conversant with (having studied only upto II standard) the same have been articulated in paragraphs 10 and 15 of the writ petition which read as follows :

Page 9 of 41

[9] The aforesaid 2 (two) points have been met by R1 and R2 in the affidavit-in-opposition in paragraphs 9 and 17 which read as follows :

Page 10 of 41

[10] A careful perusal of the above paragraphs/pleadings makes it clear that the stand of State is that the translated copies i.e., copies translated in Manipuri Meitei Mayek script was furnished by the detaining authority, only impugned preventive detention order, is not the case of State that the documents adverted to in the grounds of detention more particularly, the 11 (eleven) documents adverted to in paragraph 29 thereat in the form of a tabulation. To put it differently, translated copies of none of the 11 (eleven) documents were furnished. As translation of none of the documents were furnished, this Court deems it appropriate to write that it is not embarking upon the drill of examining which of the 11 (eleven) documents are ‘relied upon documents’ and which are ‘referred to documents’. To be noted, it is nobody’s case that all 11 (eleven) are only ‘referred to’ documents and not ‘relied upon’ documents. Only if some of the documents had not been furnished in the regional language the question of whether they are relied upon documents or merely referred to documents would arise. This is the reason why we are not embarking upon in this legal drill in instant order.

Page 11 of 41

[11] As regards the literacy level of the detenu, there is absolutely no disputation or contestation at all as the grounds of detention, in the first page itself under the caption ‘Brief Background’ makes it clear that the grounds were translated and furnished and detenu has studied only upto II standard and gave up further schooling owing to financial circumstances . This paragraph of the grounds of detention to the extent relevant reads as follows :

‘……………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………

Brief Background :

1. That you were born and brought up at Moirang Andro Lapaochum Tampak Leikai, Andro PS, IE district, Manipur. Your father is a cultivator and mother is a brewer. You have one younger brother and four younger sisters. You read up to class II standard and gave up further study due to lack of financial assistance. Then, you started engaging in cultivation of food crops and later worked as a construction worker till joining the outfit RPF/PLA.

……………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………’

[12] As regards furnishing preventive detention order, grounds and relied upon documents i.e., documents relied on qua the grounds by the detaining authority in a language known to the detenu when the detenu is not conversant with the language in which the detention order, grounds and the documents are, the law is well settled. Learned counsel for writ petitioner pressed into service Jogibhai Patel case being judgment reported in (1981) 2 SCC 427 {Shri Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel -Versus- Union of India and others}. On facts, Jogibhai Patel is a case which arose under Page 12 of 41

COFEPOSA. A COFEPOSA detenu raised several points including the point that the grounds served on him were in English, he does not know English and he knows only Gujarati but no translation of the grounds and documents in Gujarati were given to him in spite of he asking for the same. This argument was resisted by the State by pleading and arguing that the detention order and documents were fully explained in Gujarati to the detenu at the time of serving it on him but this argument of the State was repelled b y the Hon’ ble Supreme Court and Hon’ble Supreme Court made it clear that the mandate of Article 22(5) of the Constitution uses the expression ‘communicated’, ‘communicate’ is a very strong expression and that verbally explaining to a detenu without giving it in writing in a language known to the detenu or the language in which detenu understands is clearly an infraction of Article 22 (5), m ost relevant paragraphs in Jogibhai Patel are paragraphs 15 and 20. Paragraphs 15 and 20 (to the extent relevant) of Jogibhai Patel read as follows :

‘1. ……………………………………………………..

2.……………………………………………………..

………………………………………………………..

15. The additional grounds which have been pressed into arguments by Shri Ram Jethmalani, are:

(1) The respondents failed to supply despite the request of the detenu, all the documents which were relied upon by the detaining authority while passing the order of his detention, that the detaining authority purported to give him 460 documents, but later on, the detenu discovered that their number was less and many of them were either Page 13 of 41

incomplete or had been wholly withheld; that in particular 236 documents covering 236 pages were not supplied.

This is alleged in ground No. 13 of the present petition. In reply to this, in para 17 of the counter- affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, it is admitted that all the documents had not been given to the detenu, and he had been supplied enough documents which were thought to be sufficient to enable him to make an effective representation.

The petitioner came to know about the non -supply of these documents from the copy of the judgment, dated May 13, 1980, of the Gujarat High Court passed in the allied writ petitions filed on behalf of other detenus who were alleged to be the associates of the present petitioner.

(2) On July 17, 1980, a representation was made on behalf of the detenu with a request that the same be forwarded to the Central Government for exercise of its power of revocation of the detention under Section 11 of the Act. The Jailor forwarded that representation to the Central Government on July 18, 1980, but the same has not yet been disposed of. This plea is the subject of grounds 16, 17 and 26 of the Writ Petition.

A reply to these allegations is to be found in paragraphs 20 and 21 of the counter filed on behalf of the respondents, wherein it is admitted that the jailor has sent the representation at the detenu's request to the Central Govt.

(3) The grounds served on the detenu were in English. The detenu does not know English. It is stated in the affidavit of the person who served the 'grounds' that they were explained to the detenu in Gujarati which is the mother-tongue of the detenu. Admitt edly, no translation into Gujarati of the grounds of detention was given to the detenu on March 11, 1980. This being the case there was a breach of the constitutional imperative which requires that the grounds should be communicated to the detenu. It can be spelled out therefrom that the grounds must be Page 14 of 41

communicated in a language which the detenu understands.

In support of this contention, reference has been made to Haribandhu Das v. District Magistrate, Cuttack & Anr. and the judgment dated June 23, 1980 in Bakshi's case.

16. …………………………………………………………………

17. …………………………………………………………………

18. …………………………………………………………………

19. …………………………………………………………………

20. It is an admitted position that the detenu does not know English. The grounds of detention, which were served on the detenu, have been drawn up in English. It is true that Shri C. L. Antali, Police Inspector, who served the grounds of detention on the detenu, has filed an affidavit stating that he had fully explained the grounds of detention in Gujarati to the detenu. But, that is not a sufficient compliance with the mandate of Article 22(5) of the Constitution, which requires that the grounds of detention must be "communicated" to the detenu. "Communicate" is a strong word. It means that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the 'grounds' should be imparted effectively and fully to the detenu in writing in a language which he understands. The whole purpose of communicating the 'ground' to the detenu is to enable him to make a purposeful and effective representation. If the 'grounds' are only verbally explained to the detenu and nothing in writing is left with him, in a language which he understands, then that purpose is not served, and the constitutional mandate in Article 22(5) is infringed. If any authority is needed on this point, which is so obvious from Article 22(5), reference may be made to the decisions of this Court in Harikishan v. State of Maharashtra and Haribandhu Das. v. District Magistrate.’ …………………………………………………………………….’ Paragraph 13 of Jogibhai Patel which lays down the ratio reads as follows :

Page 15 of 41

‘13. The position that emerges from a survey of the above decisions is that the application of the doctrine of constructive res judicata is confined to civil actions and civil proceedings.

This principle of public policy is entirely inapplicable to illegal detention and does not bar a subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 32 of the Constitution on fresh grounds, which were not taken in the earlier petition for the same relief.’

[13] Besides Jogibhai Patel, this Court respectfully reminds itself of the oft quoted Powanammal case law i.e., Powanammal v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another reported in (1999) 2 SCC 413. Powanammal, is a case in which the writ petitioner’s son was detained vide a preventive detention order made under Act 14 of 1982 and in Powanammal, the point raised was that the detenu is conversant only with Tamil but Tamil version of the documents had not been supplied, this has hampered the right of the detenu to make an effective representation and has resulted in infraction of Article 22(5). In Powanammal also, the plea that the detention order, grounds and documents were explained in Tamil to the detenu at the time of the same being served on the detenu was brought up by State but this was repelled by Hon’ble Supreme Court by making it clear that the amplitude of safeguard embodied in Article 22(5) extends to not merely oral explanation of the grounds of detentions and the material in support thereof in a language understood by the detenu but it also extends to supplying the translated script or language which is Page 16 of 41

understandable to the detenu. This is vide paragraph 8 of Powanammal and paragraph 8 of Powanammal reads as follows:

‘8. The law relating to preventive detention has been crystalized and the principles are well-nigh settled. The amplitude of the safeguard embodied in Article 22(5)

extends not merely to oral explanation of the grounds of detention and the material in suppor t thereof in the language understood by the detenu but also to supplying their translation in script or language which is understandable to the detenu. Failure to do so would amount to denial of the right of being communicated the grounds and of being affo rded the opportunity of making a representation against the order.’

[14] This Court, respectfully follows Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel, Powanammal principles and comes to the conclusion that in the case at hand as none of the documents adverted to in the grounds (11 documents set out in a tabulation in paragraph 29 of the grounds)

were supplied in the lone language known to the detenu/lone language which the detenu understands viz., Manipuri (Meitei Mayek script) and therefore there is a clear infraction of Article 22(5) of the Constitution vitiating the impugned preventive detention order, approval and confirmation of the same and making it necessary to dislodge the same.

[15] In the normal circumstances, in a habeas corpus legal drill assailing a preventive detention order, if the petitioner succeeds on one point the other points may not be necessary to be examined, however, as two points have been raised, this Court considers it necessary to examine the 2 nd point also. The 2 nd point, as would be evident from the allusion supra turns on the detaining authority fixing Page 17 of 41

3(three) weeks time cap for sending representations. This Court, in multiple decisions, by respectfully following the ratio laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prem Lata Sharma v. District Magistrate, Mathura and Ors. reported in (1998) 4 SCC 260 held that fixing of a cap in terms of time frame for sending representations qua preventive detention orders and grounds is impermissible. To be noted, in Prem Lata Sharma case law law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court is to the effect that as long as a preventi ve detention order operates a detenu who remain s incarcerated pursuant to the preventive detention order has a right to make a representation. One of the cases in which this Court relied on Prem Lata Sharma principle and dislodged a preventive detention order is the case of Philip Khaikholal reported in 2026: MNHC: 151-DB (Manipur High Court Neutral Citation). In Philip’s case, this Court respectfully adverted to Prem Lata principle in paragraph No. 10 and the same reads as follows:

‘[10] Notwithstanding myriad grounds raised in the WP, learned counsel for writ petitioner predicated his campaign against impugned preventive detention order, impugned approval and confirmation orders on one ground and that one ground is, in the grounds of detention, time frame has been fixed by the detaining authority for detenu to make representations to R-2 and R-3. Adverting to paragraph No. 12 of grounds of detention, learned counsel for writ petitioner, Mr.

Md. Fakharuddin contended that the detaining authority in and vide impugned preventive order and grounds thereat has fixed a time frame of three weeks for the detenu to make representations to R-2 and R-3. As already alluded to supra, it was submitted by learned counsel for writ petitioner that the impugned preventive detention order and grounds were served on the detenu on 04.04.2026 (same day) and therefore three weeks therefrom (from date of detention pursuant to impugned preventive detention order) elapsed on 25.04.2026. Literacy level of the de tenu being only Grade – X in school could not Page 18 of 41

make representations immediately and by the time, he could get his act together in this regard, the three weeks time frame had elapsed. Therefore, he did not make representations to R-2 and R-3 is learned petitioner counsel’s say. This fixing time cap/time frame for detenu to make representations to R -2 and R-3 is clear infraction of Article 22(5) is learned petitioner counsel’s further say. To buttress this submission, learned counsel for writ petitioner placed reliance on an order of this Court in Yambem Manichandra Singh -vs- State of Manipur & 2 Ors. (W.P.(CRL) No. 10 of 2026, order dated 09.06.2026)

reported in Manipur High Court Neutral Citation being 2026:MNHC:100-DB. In Manichandra this Court had respectfully followed ratio laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prem Lata Sharma v. District Magistrate, Mathura and Ors. reported in (1998) 4 SCC 260 . To be noted, as regards ratio in Prem Lata, Hon’ble Supreme Court made it clear that right of a detenu to make representations subsists as long as the preventive detention order operates. It is also to be noted that prior to Manichandra case, this Court had respectfully followed Prem Lata principle in another habeas corpus petition i.e., W.P.(CRL) No. 34 of 2025 being Mutum Ranjan Meitei @ Lamjingba -vs- District Magistrate, Thoubal, Thoubal District & Ors. vide order dated 11.02.2026.’

[16] This Court had followed Prem Lata principle in an earlier case i.e., Manichandra case reported in 2026:MNHC:100- DB (High Court of Manipur, neutral citation). This Court deems it appropriate to reproduce entire Manichandra case and the same is as follows:

REPORTABLE

Item No. 1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR

AT IMPHAL

W.P.(CRL.) No. 10 of 2026

Yambem Manichandra Singh, aged about 52 years, F/o Shri Yambem Lalit Singh @ Tompok, a resident of Charangpat Mamang Leikai, P.S. Thoubal, District – Thoubal, Manipur – 795138.

… Petitioner

- Versus -

Page 19 of 41

1. The State of Manipur represented by Chief Secretary, Government of Manipur, Babupara P.O. & P.S. Imphal, Imphal West District, Manipur – 795001.

2. The District Magistrate, Imphal East, District, P.O. & P.S. Porompat, Manipur – 795005.

3. The Union of India through the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of Internal Security, North Block, New Delhi-110001.

… Respondents

B E F O R E

HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M. SUNDAR

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AHANTHEM BIMOL SINGH

For the petitioner: Mr. Ph. Sanajaoba, Advocate.

For the respondents: Mr. Th. Vashum, Deputy Government Advocate for respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

Mr. W. Darakeshwar, Senior Panel

Counsel for Central Government for

respondent No. 3.

Date of Judgment & Order : 09.06.2026

JUDGMENT & ORDER

(ORAL)

[M. Sundar, CJ]

[1] The following abbreviations/short

forms/references have been used in the order:

Sl. No. Abbreviation/short

forms/references for the

sake of

brevity/convenience and

clarity

Full

form/Expansion

1. NSA National Security

Act, 1980 (65 of

1980)

2. COFEPOSA Conservation of

Foreign Exchange

and Prevention of

Smuggling

Activities Act, 1974

3. R-1 State of Manipur

represented by Chief

Secretary,

Government of

Manipur, Babupara

P.O. & P.S. Imphal,

Imphal West

District, Manipur

Page 20 of 41

4. R-2 District Magistrate,

Imphal East,

Manipur / Detaining

Authority

5. R-3 Union of India

through the

Secretary to the

Government of

India, Ministry of

Home Affairs,

Department of

Internal Security,

North Block, New

Delhi-110001

6. WP Writ Petition

7. Detenu Shri Yambem Lalit

Singh @ Tompok,

S/o Yambem

Manichandra Singh,

aged about 22

years, a resident of

Charangpat

Mamang Leikai,

P.S. Thoubal,

Thoubal District,

Manipur – 795138.

8. Father of detenu Shri Yambem

Manichandra Singh,

a resident of

Charangpat

Mamang Leikai,

P.S. Thoubal,

Thoubal District,

Manipur – 795138.

9. FIR First Information

Report

10. UAPA Unlawful Activities

(Prevention) Act,

1967 (37 of 1967)

11. BNSS Bharatiya Nagarik

Suraksha Sanhita,

2023 (46 of 2023)

12. BNS Bharatiya Nyaya

Sanhita, 2023 (45 of

2023)

13. Impugned preventive

detention order

Order dated

08.03.2026 bearing

reference No.

Cril./NSA/No.1 of

2026/315 made by

R-2

Page 21 of 41

14. Impugned approval order Order dated

16.03.2026 bearing

reference No. H -

14/3/2026-HD-HD

made by R-1

15. Impugned confirmation

order

Order dated

08.04.2026 bearing

reference No. H -

14/3/2026-HD-HD

made by R-1

16. Sr. PCCG Senior Panel

Counsel for Central

Government

[2] Captioned WP has been filed with a habeas corpus plea qua detenu who is now incarcerated in Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa, Imphal East, Manipur inter alia owing to a preventive detention order dated 08.03.2026 bearing reference No. Cril/NSA/No.1 of 2026/315 made by detaining authority i.e., R-2.

[3] In the hearing, Mr. Ph. Sanajaoba, learned counsel on record for writ petitioner, Mr. Th. Vashum, learned State counsel for R-1 and R-2 and Mr. W. Darakeshwar, learned Sr. PCCG are before this Court (Physical Court). R -1 has filed an affidavit-in-opposition dated 30.05.2026 (wrongly mentioned as 30.05.2025 in the affidavit -in-opposition), R-2 has filed an affidavit-in-opposition dated 29.05.2026 (wrongly mentioned as 29.05.2025 in the affidavit -in-opposition) and R -3 has filed an affidavit-in-opposition dated 16.05.2026. To be noted, R -2 is detaining authority.

[4] The afore -referred impugned preventive detention order made by R -2 was approved by R -1 vide order dated 16.03.2026 bearing reference No. H -14/3/2026-HD-HD made by R-1 in exercise of power under Section 3(4) of NSA Act (impugned approval order) and it was subsequently confirmed by R-1 in and vide order dated 08.04.2026 bearing reference No. H- 14/3/2026-HD-HD made by R -1 in exercise of power under Section 12(1) of NSA Act (impugned confirmation order).

[5] Learned counsel for writ petitioner, in his campaign against the afore -referred impugned preventive detention order made by R -2 (detaining authority) which was subsequently approved and confirmed by R -1 vide impugned approval and confirmation orders, notwithstanding myriad grounds in the WP, predicated his challenge on one point and that one point is, in the grounds of detention dated 09.03.2026 (served on the detenu on 11.03.2026 at 06:15 p.m.) the detaining authority vide paragraph 10 threat has prescribed a time limit of 3 (three) weeks {from the date of detention} for making representation to the Government of Manipur as well as Central Government. Learned counsel submits that such fixing of time frame for the detenu to make representations to Stat e Government (appropriate Government as well as Central Government) is a clear infraction of rights enshrined in Article Page 22 of 41

22(5) of the Constitution of India. In support of his contention, learned counsel for writ petitioner pressed into service two case laws namely, Mutum Ranjan Meitei’s case reported in 2026 (1)

MNLJ 126 : 2026 Legal Eagle 6 and Smt. Laishram Nilajit Shija’s case reported in 2026:MNHC:43-DB (Manipur High Court neutral citation). To be noted, further details of these two cases are Mutum Ranjan Meitei @ Lamjingba -vs- District Magistrate, Thoubal, Thoubal District & Ors. being order dated 11.02.2026 made in W.P .(Crl.) No. 34 of 2025 and Smt.

Laishram Nilajit Shija -vs- State of Manipur & Ors. being order dated 12.03.2026 made in W.P.(Crl.) No. 1 of 2026. In Laishram Nilajit Shija, Mutum Ranjan Meitei has been followed and both judgments have been rendered by this Division Bench by respectfully following Prem Lata Sharma rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court i.e., Prem Lata Sharma [(1998) 4 SCC 260]. To be noted, in Prem Lata Sharma , the principle laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court is, right of a detenu to make representations subsists as long as preventive detention order operates. To be noted, there will be a little more elaboration on these case laws elsewhere infra in this order.

[6] Learned counsel for writ petitioner, submitted that 3 (three) weeks time from the date of detention elapsed on 30.03.2026 and detenu did not make any representation either to State Government or to the Central Government as he was under the firm belie f that he cannot make the representation after 3 (three) weeks from the date of detention had elapsed. It was submitted that this has been clearly articulated in the WP, more particularly in paragraph 10 and ground (e) thereat which read as follows :

’10. That, it is humbly submitted that in paragraph No. 10 of the grounds of detention under Section 8 of the NSA, 1980 [Annexure – N/2], it has been informed by the Respondent No. 2 that the detenu have a right to make a representation to Respondent No. 1 & 3 against the impugned order of detention order and he is given the earliest opportunity for making such representation and these representation should be submitted within 3 (three) weeks time from the date of detention, i.e. 08-03-2026. However, since the detenu has been incarcerated in Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa in pursuance of the impugned detention order he could not make the said representations to the concerned authorities within the stipulated time period or thereafter.

In other words, the deten u is under the firm itself belief that he cannot make any representation after three weeks owing to the time period being fixed in the grounds of detention [Annexure -N/2]. The relevant paragraph No. 10 of the said grounds of detention [Annexure – N/2] is reproduced herein below:

Page 23 of 41

“That, you are hereby informed that

your have a right to make

representation to the Government of

Manipur as well as to the Central

Government against this order of

detention passed against you and you

are hereby given the earliest

opportunity for making s uch

representation. If you wish to do so,

your representation is to be sent

through the Superintendent of

Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa to the

Chief Secretary, Government of

Manipur”, Manipur Secretariat, South

Block, Imphal, Manipur – 795001 in

respect of representation to the

Government of Manipur and to the

“Secretary to the Government of India,

Ministry of Home Affairs”

(Department of Internal Security),

North Block, New Delhi – 110001 in

respect of representation to the

Central Government and should be

submitted within 3 weeks time from the

date of detention. Further, you are

hereby informed that you have the

right to make representation to the

detaining authority within 12 days

from the date of detention or until the

order is approved by the State

Government whichever is earlier. The

representation is to be sent to the

District Magistrate, Imphal East

District, Porompat, Manipur – 795005

though Superintendent, Manipur

Central Jail, Sajiwa. The

representation if any would be placed

before the Advisory Boa rd within 3

weeks time from the date of your

detention as the Government is bound

under law to produce before the board

for its consideration.”

GROUNDS

a) ……………………………………

………………………………….

……………………………………

………………………………….

Page 24 of 41

……………………………………

…………………………………..

d) …………………………………………

e) For that, that fixing of time

period by the Respondent No. 2

in the grounds of detention

[Annexure-N/2] for submitting

representations to the

Respondent No. 1 and 3 has

infringed the right of the detenu

enshrined under Article 22(5)

of the Constitution of India.’

[7] It was further pointed out that in response to the afore-referred grounds raised with clarity and specificity, R - 1 and R -3 in their counter affidavits dated 30.05.2025 and 16.05.2026 respectively have merely said that this is in the domain of R-2 (detaining authority) and it is for R -2 (detaining authority) to respond to this. It was further pointed out that R -2 (detaining authority) in her affidavit -in-opposition dated 29.05.2026 has merely referred to Section 10 of NSA Act and averred that it prescr ibes three weeks time frame. Relevant paragraphs in the counter affidavit of R -1 are paragraphs 7 and 10 and the same read as follows:

‘7. That, with reference to para Nos. 10 and 11 of the writ petition, the deponents begs to submit that the content in these paras are closely related to District Magistrate, Imphal East, Manipur.

Hence, District Magistrate, Imphal East,

Manipur may offer comment.

10. That, with reference to Para Nos. 16(d) and 16(e) of the Writ Petition, the deponent has no comment to offer as the same may be replied by the District Magistrate, Imphal East, Manipur.’

R-3 has merely submitted that there is no allegation against R -3 and has left it to detaining authority to respond, this is vide paragraph 3 and the same reads as follows:

‘3. That, none of para of the petition is related to action taken by the Respondent No.3 i.e., the Ministry of Home Affairs. All averments are related to the other respondents and as such no Page 25 of 41

reply is being given for these in this affidavit by the answering respondent.’

[8] Thereafter, it was pointed out that counter affidavit of R -2 (detaining authority) is significant, relevant paragraphs are paragraphs 9 and 13 and the same read as follows:

‘9. That, with reference to Para No.10 of the Writ Petition, the deponent begs to submit that the detenu was provided the prescribed timeline as admissible U/S 10 of the said Act, and representation through Superintendent of Police, Manipur Central Jail, was permitted for placing the same before the Advisory Board/Committee.

13. That, with reference to Para No.11(e) of the Writ Petition, the deponent denied the allegations made therein as the period for submission of representation is specifically provided under the Act.’

[9] It was reiterated that R -2 has merely taken umbrage under Section 10 of NSA Act but Section 10 of NSA Act merely prescribes 3 (three) weeks time frame for the appropriate Government to place the grounds before the Advisory Board and it merely says tha t the grounds should be placed before the Advisory Board by the appropriate Government within 3 (three) weeks together with representation ‘if any’.

[10] In response to the afore -referred point, learned counsel for R -1 and R -2, drew our attention to afore -referred paragraphs 9 and 13 of the affidavit -in-opposition of R-2 dated 29.05.2026 (wrongly mentioned as 29.05.2025) and submitted that the intention qua paragraph 10 of the grounds of detention is merely to let the detenu know that if he makes a representation within 3 (three) weeks, the same will be placed before the Advisory Board though it has not been articulated well. In this regard, it is dee med appropriate to extract and reproduce paragraph 10 of grounds of detention, this Court does so and the same reads as follows:

‘10. That, you are hereby informed that you have a right to make representation to the Government of Manipur as well as to the Central Government against this order of detention passed against you and you are hereby given the earliest opportunity for makin g such representation. If you wish to do so, your representation is to be sent through the Superintendent, Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa to the "Chief Secretary, Government of Manipur", Manipur Secretariat, South Block, Imphal, Page 26 of 41

Manipur-795001 in respect of representation to the Government of Manipur and to the "Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home affairs" (Department of Internal Security), North Block, New Delhi -110001 in respect of representation to the Centra l Government and should be submitted within 3 weeks time from the date of detention. Further, you are hereby informed that you have the right to make representation to the detaining authority within 12 days from the date of detention or till the order is a pproved by the State Government whichever is earlier. The representation is to be sent to the District Magistrate, Imphal East District, Porompat, Manipur-795005 through Superintendent, Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa. The representation if any would be placed before the Advisory Board within 3 weeks time from the date of your detention as the Government is bound under law to produce before the board for its consideration.’

It was submitted that it is not happily worded but the intention is only to make the detenu know that if he makes a representation within 3 (three) weeks, the same will be placed before the Advisory Board. Besides this argument, learned counsel placed reliance on a case law namely, Union of India - vs- Paul Manickam & Anr. [(2003) 8 SCC 342] and submitted that a detenu who does not make any representation cannot be heard to contend that fixing of time fame is infraction of Article 22(5) of Constitution of India.

[11] As regards learned Sr. PCCG for R -3, learned State counsel for Central Government very fairly submits that R- 3 is more in the nature of a formal party, R -3 has not received representation but there is no allegation whatsoever against R -3 in the WP. Therefore, a short counter affidavit has been filed and R-3 really does not have a say with regard to afore -referred contestation turning on fixing of time limits for making representations.

[12] This Court now embarks upon the legal drill of discussion and setting out its dispositive reasoning.

[13] In the afore-referred Mutum Ranjan Meitei, this Court respectfully followed Ameena Begum rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court and wrote that a preventive detention order is justiciable at least on 7 (seven) different grounds in a judicial review and adumbration of these 7 (seven) grounds has been set out in paragraph 7. The relevant paragraph in Mutum Ranjan Meitei’s case in this regard is paragraph 7 and the same reads as follows:

‘[7] This Court, carefully examined the rival contentions. At the outset, it is to be noted that the question of justiciability of subjective satisfaction of a detaining authority in Page 27 of 41

preventive detention matters came up for

consideration before Hon’ble Supreme Court in several cases and we respectfully refer to a recent judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court being ‘Ameena Begum vs. State of Telangana & Ors.’ reported in (2023) 9 SCC 587 . In Ameena Begum, after a survey of various case laws on preventive detention including case laws on preventive detentions under NSA, Hon’ble Supreme Court made it clear that areas within which validity of subjective satisfaction can be tested have been carved out and an adumbration of the carved out areas is as follows:

(a) When the detaining authority

has not applied its mind at all;

(b) When there is dishonest

exercise of power by detaining

authority;

(c) Exercise of power of detaining

authority for improper purpose;

(d) Detaining authority acting

under dictation of another body;

(e) When the subjective

satisfaction recorded by detaining

authority is based on application of

wrong test or misconception of a statute;

(f) When the detaining authority

has arrived at and recorded subjective

satisfaction without the same being

grounded on materials which are

rationally probative value.

(Underlining made by this Court for

ease of reference.)

To be noted, adumbration supra has

been set out by this Court by respectfully following paragraph No. 16 of Ameena Begum [paragraph No. 16 as in SCC report being (2023) 9 SCC 587] wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court relied on paragraph Nos. 8 & 9 of ‘Khudiram Das vs. State of West Bengal’ reported in (1975) 2 SCC 81 which was rendered by a Hon’ble four Judges Bench.’

[14] Instant case is one of detaining authority not applying its mind i.e., not applying mind in fixing 3 (three) weeks time frame for the detenu for making representations to State and Central Governments by misreading Section 10 of NSA Act which prescribes 3 (three) weeks time frame for the State Government to place grounds of detention before Advisory Board and merely adds that State Government while doing so shall also place representation ‘if any’ from the detenu. Be that as it may, in Mutum Ranjan Meitei , this Court respectfully following Prem Lata Sharma rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Page 28 of 41

Court, made it clear that fixing of time frames by detaining authority in the grounds, for the detenu for making representations is clearly an infraction of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. To be noted, on facts, Mutum Ranjan Meitei was also a case of preventive detention order under NSA Act and that was also a case where time frame was fixed by detaining authority for the detenu to make representations.

Subsequently, in Laishram Nilajit Shija , this Court reiterated Mutum Ranjan Meitei. To be noted, on facts, Laishram Nilajit Shija is also a case where the detaining authority had fixed time frames for the detenu to make representations. Relevant paragraph in Laishram Nilajit Shija is paragraph 16 and the same reads as follows:

[16] As would be evident from paragraphs 5 and 6 of grounds of detention (extracted and reproduced supra), the detaining authority has fixed time frames for sending representations to the detaining authority, State Government as well as the Central Government. This is the reason why the detenu has sent the 2 nd representation i.e., representation dated 08.12.2025 to the Hon'ble Advisory Board.

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Premlata Sharma

(Smt.) vs. District Magistrate, Mathura & Ors.’ reported in (1998) 4 SCC 2 60 held that there can be no period of limitation regarding exercise of the right of a detenu to make a representation and corresponding obligation of the Central Government to consider the same for deciding upon the question of order of detention as such a r ight of a detenu and corresponding/axiomatic obligation of State subsists so long as the preventive detention order continues to operate. This Court, respectfully following Premlata principle laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in order dated 11.02.2026 in W.P. (Crl.) No. 34 of 2025 (Mutum Ranjan Meitei @ Lamjingba vs District Magistrate, Thoubal District & Ors.)

reported in 2026 (2) MNLJ0 : 2026 Legal

Eagle 6 which is a case of preventive detention order couched in a language akin to the impugned preventive detention order as regards paragraph 5 & 6, held that fixing of timeframes for sending representations is a clear infraction of sacrosanct Constitutional right enshrined in Article 22(5). This Court is informed that this 11.02.2026 order in W.P.

(Crl.) No. 34 of 2025 has since been given effect to and the detenu has since been enlarged. Most relevant portionss of Mutum Ranjan Meitei case are contained in paragraph 10 & 11 and relevant portions reads as follows:

Page 29 of 41

‘[10] … It has also been made clear that

a detenu qua a impugned preventive

detention order is entitled to have his

representation considered as

expeditiously/at the earliest. The

significant clincher is, neither the

Constitution nor the long line of

authorities have either provided for or

justified fixing of time frames for

making such representations. It comes

to light that in ‘ Premlata Sharma

(Smt.) vs. District Magistrate, Mathura

& Ors.’ reported in (1998) 4 SCC 260,

Hon’ble Supreme Court has made it

clear that there can be no period of

limitation regarding exercise of right of the detenu to make a representation and corresponding obligation of the Central Government to consider the same for deciding upon the question of order of detention as such a right of a detenu and obligation of State subsist so long as the preventive detention order continues.

To be noted, on facts, Premlata also

arose under NSA, a preventive

detention order made under NSA was

assailed and the issue that fell for

consideration is refusal to send detenu’s representation to Central Government on the ground that the power of the revocation of a detention order is vested only in the State Government under Section 14 of NSA. It is in this context that in Premlata, Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the ratio that the right of detenu to make a representation and corresponding obligation of the Government to consider the same expeditiously (at the earliest) subsist so long as the preventive detention order operates/detention continues. In the case on hand, therefore, fixing of twelve days time frame qua representation to the detaining authority and fixing of three weeks time frame for representations to the State and Central Governments is clearly flawed and unacceptable. On an extreme demurer , even if the argument of learned State counsel that the time frames were fixed as impugned preventive detention order will be valid only for twelve days unless approved by the State Government and the State Government has a Page 30 of 41

responsibility to place the

representation before the Advisory

Board within three weeks is accepted,

the same does not come to the aid of

learned State counsel in his effort to

defend the impugned preventive

detention order. The reasons are, as

regards twelve days, though there may

be some semblance of justification,

there is absolutely no justification as

regards fixing three weeks time frame

for representation to the State

Government. The reason is, Section 10

of NSA captioned ‘Reference to

Advisory Board’ makes it clear that the

appropriate Government shall within 3

weeks from the date of detention of a

person place before the Advisory

Board, the grounds on which order has

been made and representation, if any .

Section 10 of NSA reads as follows :

‘10. Reference to Advisory

Board.—

Save as otherwise expressly

provided in this Act, in every

case where a detention order

has been made under this Act,

the appropriate Government

shall, within three weeks from

the date of detention of a person

under the order, place before

the Advisory Board constituted

by it under section 9, the

grounds on which the order has

been made and the

representation, if any, made by

the person affected by the

order, and in case where the

order has been made by an

officer mentioned in sub -

section (3) of section 3, also the

report by such officer under

sub-section (4) of that section.’

(underlining and bold font

made /used by this Court for

ease of reference).

[11] The above makes it clear that the

statute i.e. Section 10 of NSA is clear as daylight that a State Government is under obligation to place the representation of the detenu before the Page 31 of 41

Advisory Board only if the detenu

chooses to send a representation. To put

it differently, it is axiomatic that if the detenu does not send a representation within three weeks from the date of detention, State Government will be under no obligation much le ss a statutory obligation to place it before the Advisory Board and the State Government cannot be found fault with in this regard. Therefore, the argument that three weeks time frame for representation to State Government was fixed in grounds of detention to ensure that the representation is placed before the Advisory Board does not hold water.

The buttressing factor is, if State

Government receives a representation

after three weeks from the date of

detention, it has a sacrosanct duty to

consider the same for revocation under

Section 14 of NSA. To be noted, this is a indefeasible analogy that flaws from Premlata principle i.e., principle that detenu’s right to make a representation and obligation/duty of State to consider the same at the earliest subsist a s long as the preventive detention order operates/detention continues. As regards the representation to the Central Government this three weeks phenomenon does not exist at all and therefore the argument is a non starter.’

To be noted, in afore -referred paragraph 16 of Laishram Nilajit Shija , relevant paragraph of Mutum Ranjan Meitei had been extracted and reproduced.

[15] This Court carefully considered the submissions of learned State counsel for R-1 & R-2 i.e., the submissions that the intention of the detaining authority in fixing 3 (three) weeks time frame for the detenu to make representations is only to let the detenu know that if he makes representation within 3 (three)

weeks, the same will be placed before the Advisory Board though it has neither been clearly articulated in the grounds nor are the grounds happily worded. Even on a demurer, this argument does not pass muster and it does cut ice with this Court for two clear reasons. The first reason is, 3 (three) weeks time frame has been fixed by the detaining authority vide paragraph 10 of the grounds of detention not merely for the representation to be made by the detenu to State Government but it has been fixed for the representation to be made by the detenu to Central Government also. If the intention of the detaining auth ority was merely to ensure representation is made and the same is placed before the Advi sory Board within 3 (three) weeks, 3 (three)

Page 32 of 41

weeks time frame (if at all) should have been fixed for the representation to be sent to the State Government alone. To be noted, this Court makes it clear that time frame cannot be fixed and this is only a test on a demurer. Therefore, it is not mandatory that the detenu should make representation within 3 (three)

weeks. A detenu can make a representation to the State Government even after 3 (three) weeks as the State Government has the power to revoke a detention order at any time by resorting to Section 14 of NSA Act. The second reason as to why the argument does not cut ice with this Court is the clear language in which Section 10 of NSA Act is couched and Section 10 of NSA Act reads as follows:

‘10. Reference to Advisory Board. - Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, in every case where a detention order has been made under this Act, the appropriate Government shall, within three weeks from the date of detention of a person under the o rder, place before the Advisory Board constituted by it under section 9, the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order, and in case where the order has been made by an officer mentioned in sub-section (3) of section 3, also the report by such officer under sub-section (4) of that section.’

[16] A plain reading of afore -referred Section 10 of NSA Act makes it clear that 3 (three) weeks time frame fixed thereat applies only to the appropriate Government namely R -1 (State Government) and not the detenu. Moreover, Section 10 of NSA Act makes it clear that R -1 shall place the grounds of detention before the Advisory Board along with representation ‘if any’ meaning that if there is a representation from the detenu, the same shall also be placed before the Advisory Board. It is axiomatic that if there is no representation from the detenu within 3 (three) weeks, it will suffice if the State Government places the grounds of detention before the Advisory Board and it is not mandatory or compulsory qua State Government to place the representation of the detenu. Any representation made to State Government post three weeks from the date of detention will be considered (expeditiously, without delay) by the State Government inter-alia in the light of Section 14 of NSA Act.

These two reasons, even on a demurer, fla ttens the argument of learned State counsel for R1 and R2 does not cut ice with this Court. In any event, it is made clear that time frames cannot be fixed in the light of Prem Lata principle i.e., time frame cannot be fixed even for a representation to be made to State Government as sanctus right of the detenu in this regard subsists as long as the preventive detention order operates.

[17] This takes this Court to Paul Manickam which was pressed into service by learned State counsel. Paul Manickam is a case which arose under COFEPOSA. A preventive detention order was made on 26.04.2000 and on Page 33 of 41

11.05.2000 detenu’s father addressed a representation to the Hon’ble President of India and thereafter within 4 (four) days i.e., on 15.05.2000 a habeas corpus petition was filed before Madras High Court and in this habeas corpus petition, the writ petitioner had averred that one representation had been sent to the State of Tamil Nadu and another representation had been sent to Union of India. This was clearly incorrect as representation had been sent to Hon’ble President of India. Be that as it may, 3 (three) different points were raised in the legal drill of habeas corpus and the habeas corpus writ petition was dismissed and thereafter, a review application was filed on 08.12.2000 and in the review application, citing the representation sent to the Hon’ble President of India, the preventive detention order was interfered with by the High Court. It is in this context that Hon’ble Supreme Court, made it clear that the writ petitioner had not come to Court with clean hands, had not made correct averments and h ad for all practical purposes misled the Court and therefore, the writ petitioner does not deserve any relief in the hands of Court. Hon’ble Supreme Court made it clear that sending a representation to Hon’ble President of India thereafter deflecting the course of justice by letting loose red herrings is an unclean approach which is unacceptable. The facts of Paul Manickam are clearly distinguishable.

[18] This Court in writing that the facts of Paul Manickam are distinguishable, respectfully follows the declaration of law made by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2002)

3 SCC 533. As regards Padma Sundara Rao, this Court chooses to use the expression ‘ declaration of law’ rather than ‘ratio’ as Padma Sundara Rao was rendered by a Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court. On facts, Padma Sundara Rao arose under Central Land Acquisition Act i.e. ‘Land Acquisition Act, 1894’. The question in Padma Sundara Rao was whether after quashing of Section 6 declaration, will State get a fresh period of one year to make another declaration under Section 6. In this factual matrix, the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court went into the question of how case laws sho uld be cited and relied upon. It was made clear that case laws should be cited and relied upon only after setting out the facts and one factual difference can make a world of difference. This princip le was declared as law by the Constitution Bench inter alia by referring to Lord Morris in Herrington v. British Railways Board .

Relevant paragraph in Padma Sundara Rao is paragraph 9 and the same reads as follows:

‘9. Courts should not place reliance on

decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgement as thoug h they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case, said Lord Morris in Herrington V. British Railways Board.

Page 34 of 41

Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases.’

[19] Respectfully following Padma Sundara Rao declaration, this Court has no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that Paul Manickam is clearly distinguishable on facts and does not come to the aid of the learned State counsel for R-1 and R -2. The reason is, unlike Paul Manickam, this is not a case of misleading the Court or incorrectly averring in the WP that the detenu has sent a representation to a particular authority after having sent it to another authority who is the highest authority in the Country namely Hon’ble Presiden t of India. Suffice to write that Paul Manickam does not come to the aid of learned State counsel for this re ason and also because the principle is different. Principle has been set out in paragraph 19 of Paul Manickam and the same reads as follows:

‘19. As noted supra, for the first time in the review application it was disclosed that the representation was made to the President of India and no representation was made to the State of Tamil Nadu or the Union of India who were arrayed in the writ petitio n as parties. This appears to be a deliberate attempt to create confusion and reap an undeserved benefit by adopting such dubious device. The High Court also transgressed its jurisdiction in entertaining the review petition with an entirely new substrat um of issues. Considering the limited scope for review, the High Court ought not to have taken into account factual aspects which were not disclosed or were concealed in the writ petition. While dealing with a habeas corpus application undue importance is not to be attached to technicalities, but at the same time where the court is satisfied that an attempt has been made to deflect the course of justice by letting loose red herrings the court has to take serious note of unclean approach. Whenever a represen tation is made to the President and the Governor instead of the indicated authorities, it is but natural that the representation should indicate as to why the representation was made to the President or the Governor and not the indicated authorities. It sh ould also be clearly indicated as to whom the representation has been made specifically, and not in the manner done in the case at hand. The President as well as the Governor, no doubt are constitutional Heads of the respective Governments but the day -to-day Page 35 of 41

administration at respective levels is carried on by the Heads of the Departments/Ministries concerned and the designated officers who alone are ultimately responsible and accountable for the action taken or to be taken in a given case. If really the citizen concerned genuinely and honestly felt or was interested in getting an expeditious consideration or disposal of his grievance, he would and should honestly approach the real authorities concerned and would not adopt any dubious devices with the sole aim of deliberately creating a situation for delay in consideration and cry for relief on his own manipulated ground, by directing his representation to an authority which is not directly immediately concerned with such consideration.’ Therefore, the principle is, a manipulated ground flowing from dubious deliberate deflection should not aid a detenu.

[20] Learned State counsel, made a faint attempt to submit that the facts in Prem Lata are slightly different. This Court carefully considered this argument. Prem Lata also arose under NSA Act. In Prem Lata , representation to State Government was made and the same was rejected and a copy of the said representation along with para wise comments was forwarded to Government of India and Central Government also rejected the representation. Thereafter, the detenu made another representation to the Government of India but the representation given to Superintendent of Jail in which the detenu was incarcerated was not sent to the Central Government on the ground that it had been sent after an extraordinary delay. It is in this context that Hon’ble Supreme Court wen t into the question as to whether time frame can be fixed for sending representations and whether the concept of delay in sending representations by the detenu can be countenanced in preventive detentions. It was made clear that delay on part of State in disposing of the representation can be infraction of binding with rights enshrined in Article 22(5) of Constitution of India but the detenu has to be given earliest opportunity to make an effective representation and the right of the detenu to make a representation vide Article 22(5) qua a preventive detention order subsists as long as the preventive detention order operates. Therefore, Prem Lata is not distinguishable on facts and the principle applies squarely to instant case. This principle laid down in Prem Lata has been respectfully followed by this Court in Mutum Ranjan Meitei and Laishram Nilajit Shija. To be noted, as regards Mutum Ranjan Meitei and Laishram Nilajit Shija , this Court is informed without any disputation by the learned State counsel that the State has released the detenus accepting the orders of this Court.

To put it differently, Mutum Ranjan Meitei and Laishram Nilajit Shija have been given legal quietus by State and have attained finality. In any event, both these judgments viz., Mutum Page 36 of 41

Ranjan Meitei and Laishram Nilajit Shija were rendered by this Court by respectfully following Hon’ble Supreme Court vide Prem Lata and Ameena Begum.

[21] Before concluding, this court deems it appropriate to write/record (only for the purposes of completion of facts) that the impugned preventive detention order is predicated on a lone FIR i.e., FIR dated 26.12.2025 on the file of LLI Police Station (t his Court is informed that LLI stands for Lamlai) being FIR No. 111(12)2025 LLI-PS for alleged offences under Sections 109(1)/111(2)/310(6)/329(3) BNS and 25(1 -C)

Arms Act added 20 UAPA.

[22] This Court is acutely conscious that a preventive detention order can be made even on the basis of a lone FIR but the point is, pursuant to this lone FIR, the detenu was arrested on 26.12.2025 at 08:30 p.m. 90 (ninety) days therefrom elapsed on 05.04.2026. Learned counsel for writ petitioner, on instructions, asserts that State has neither filed final report nor filed for extension of time for filing final report or for extension of remand by resorting to Section 43D(2) of UAPA. To be noted, final report is to be filed within 90 (ninety) days from the date of arrest and as regards UA(P)A Act, offences vide Section 43D(2) there is a provision for prosecution to seek extension of time and extension of remand up to 180 (one hundred and eighty) days.

Though 90 (ninety) days from the date of arrest elapsed on 05.04.2026, until this day (09.06.2026) State has neither file d final report (charge sheet) nor resorted to Section 43D (2) of UAPA and filed an application for extension of time for filing final report / extension of remand. This in effect means that the detenu is entitled to seek default bail. This Court makes it clear that this Court is not interfering with the impugned preventive detention order now on this ground but this is being recorded only for completely and comprehensively capturing facts and making it clear that as regards regular prosecution after letting the matter slip away in regular Trial Court. State which has not even sought extension of remand / extension of time for filing final report is now detaining the detenu solely on the basis of impugned preventive detention order which has been subsequently approved and confirmed by R-1 on 16.03.2026 and 08.04.2026 respectively.

[23] In the light of narration, discussion and dispositive reasoning set out thus far, this Court has no hesitation in writing that the impugned preventive detention order made by R-2 on 08.03.2026 approved and confirmed by R -1 on 16.03.2026 and 08.04.2026 deserve to be dislodged/set aside on the ground that there is clear infraction of sanctus rights enshrined in Article 22(5) and vested in the detenu.

[24] Ergo, the sequitur is, captioned WP is allowed.

The impugned detention order dated 08.03.2026 bearing reference No. Cril/NSA/No.1 of 2026/315 made by R -2 (detaining authority), approval order dated 16.03.2026 bearing reference No. H -14/3/2026-HD-HD a nd confirmation order dated 08.04.2026 bearing reference No. H -14/3/2026-HD-HD made by R -1 are all set aside and Shri Yambem Lalit Singh @ Tompok, S/o Y. Manichandra Singh of Charangpat Mamang Page 37 of 41

Leikai, P.S. Thoubal, Thoubal District, Manipur aged about 22 years now lodged in Central Jail Sajiwa, Imphal East, Manipur is directed to be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case/s. There shall be no order as to costs.

JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE

FR/NFR

Bipin

P.S. I : Upload forthwith.

P.S. II : All concerned will stand bound by web copy uploaded in High Court website inter alia as the same is QR coded.’

[17] This court is informed that in both cases i.e., Manichandra and Philip, the detenus were since released complying with the orders of this Court. Therefore, Manichandra and Philip hold the field and they continue to operate. Manichandra and Philip having been rendered by respectfully following Prem Lata principle laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court, we have no hesitation in writing that in the instant case the sanctus rights of detenu enshrined in Article 22(5) have been infringed owing to the timeline cap fixed i.e., 3(three)

weeks timeline/cap for sending representation. The reason is , in instant case, on facts, the detenu had not sent any representation at all. To be noted, the detenu has not sent any representation until this day. The argument of the learned counsel for petitione r that the detenu could not send representations within 3(three) weeks from the date of detention as 3(three) weeks from the date of detention elapsed on 13.05.2026 but the translated copies i.e., copy of the preventive detention order and the grounds (without translation of documents)

Page 38 of 41

were furnished only under cover of a letter dated 03.06.2026 is clearly acceptable and is an indefeasible argument.

[18] However, for the sake of making this order comprehensive this court deems it appropriate to capture the position that as regards this 2 nd point, the same has been articulated in the writ petition vide ground (l) (in paragraph No. 21) which reads as follows:

‘l) For that, fixing of time period by the Respondent No. 2 in the grounds of detention [Annexure-N/2] for submitting representations to the Respondent No. 1 and 3 has infringed the right of the detenu enshrined under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.’ [19] Afore-referred ground l) raised by the writ petitioner has been met by R1 & R2 in the affidavit-in-opposition vide paragraph No.

29 and the same read as follows:

‘[29] That, with reference to para no. 21 (l) of the present petition, the answering deponent humbly submits that the petitioner has neither pleaded nor established that any representation submitted by the detenu was refused, ignored, or rejected solely on the g round that it was filed beyond the indicated period. In the absence of any actual prejudice or denial of consideration, the allegation of violation of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution is unsustainable and liable to be rejected following on the grounds that:- i) The time limit was directory not mandatory;

ii) The Constitutional Right to make a representation remained intact;

iii) No prejudice was caused; and

iv) There was substantial compliance with Article of the Constitution.’

[20] A careful perusal of the stated position of State makes it clear that the timeline /time limit/cap prescribed by State is only directory and mandatory and the constitutional right to make a Page 39 of 41

representation remains intact. This argument is a non-starter as the detenu whose literacy level is II standard in school would certainly not be able to appreciate the distinction between a timeline which is directory and not mandatory. Be that as it may, State has fairly averred that the constitutional right is intact but the argument that no prejudice was caused to detenu is unacceptable as the detenu has not sent any representation at all muc h less effective representation .

Hon’ble Supreme Court, elucidating on representation has made it clear that the right of a detenu to make a representation more particularly vide Article 22(5) is not only ‘representation’ but ‘effective representation ’. In this view of the matter, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the ar gument that no prejudice was caused to the detenu owing to timeline being fixed is unacceptable.

[21] The entire files i.e., State files were produced in Court and this Court had the benefit of perusing the files pertaining to the impugned preventive detention order. In the grounds of detention, as already alluded to supra, in paragraph No. 29 thereat, there is a tabulation of the list of documents (11 documents) that have been adverted to. One of the 11 documents shown as document No. viii is a copy of notification bearing reference No. S.O. 4899 ( E) dated 13.11.2023 made by MHA(GoI) (to be noted, ‘MHA’ denotes ‘Ministry of Home Affairs ’ and ‘GOI’ denotes ‘Government of India ’). This notification is available in the file and the detaining authority has Page 40 of 41

obviously adverted to the same. This notification makes it clear that the organization which the detenu is alleged to be part of viz., People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been declared as an ‘unlawful association’ and vide proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 3 of UAPA the notification has been given immediate effect making it clear that the notification was subject to order to be made under Section 4 of UAPA.

Though it is submitted at the Bar that Tribunal had in fact passed a confirmation order on 06.05.2024 qua this 13.11.2023 notification the same was not before the detaining authority. It is not adverted to anywhere in the grounds. However, as the petitioner has succeeded on both the points canvassed we deemed it appropriate to not to enter upon a legal drill on this aspect and examine the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority though subject ive satisfaction, (though) subjective, has been held to be justiciable by Hon’ble Supreme Court on certain grounds. We make it clear that this is not one of the grounds on which we are dislodging the impugned preventive detention order, impugned approval orders and impugned confirmation orders. To be noted, this is not the petitioner ’s plea but as we have noticed this point, the same is being recorded to highlight that there are other infirmities too.

[22] Ergo, sequitur is, captioned WP is allowed. The impugned preventive detention order dated 21.04.2026 bearing reference No. Cril/NSA/No.5 of 2026 made by R2/detaining authority, 2(two) approval orders, one dated 29.04.2026 bearing reference No.

Page 41 of 41

H-14/9/2026-HD-HD and another dated 01.05.2026 bearing reference No. H-14/9/2026-HD-HD made by R1 and impugned confirmation order dated 27.05.2026 bearing No. H-14/9/2026-HD-HD made by R1 are all set-aside and Mr. Phanjoubam Rabi Meitei @ Luwangngamba 28 years, son of Ph. Kulla Meitei of Andro Lapaochum Tampak Leikai Andro P.S. Police Station jurisdiction, Imphal East District, now lodged in Manipur Central Jail, Sajiwa is directed to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case/s. There shall be no order as to costs.

JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE

FR/NFR

Sushil/Indrajeet

P.S. I : Upload forthwith

P.S. II : All concerned will stand bound by instant order vide web copy uploaded in High Court website inter -alia as the same is QR coded.