Bombay High Court judgment of 6 Oct 2026

-IA1273-2026.DOC

Santosh

IN THE HIGH Court OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 1273 OF 2026 IN ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO. 1061 OF 2026 The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. ...Applicant In the matter between The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. ...Petitioner Versus Chugoku Marines Paints S PTE Ltd …Respondent Mr. Satish Chandra Upadhyay, for the Applicant - Petitioner.

Mr. Jamsheed Master, a/w Rakesh V Misar, i/b RVM Legal, for the Respondent.

CORAM: N. J. JAMADAR, J.

RESERVED ON: 24th SEPTEMBER, 2026

PRONOUNCED ON: 6th OCTOBER, 2026

ORDER:-

1. This is an application for condonation of delay in preferring a petition to set aside an arbitral award dat ed 30 th June, 2025 passed by the sole arbitrator in Arbitration Application No. 117 of 2021, under the provisions of Se ction 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Arbitrat ion Act, 1996”).

2. Pursuant to a contract dated 1 st February, 2018 between the applicant-petitioner and respondent-claimant, the respondent had supplied marine paints to the applicant’s 1/22 SANTOSH SUBHASH KULKARNI Digitally signed by SANTOSH SUBHASH KULKARNI Date: 2026.10.06 22:09:52 +0530 -IA1273-2026.DOC vessels and raised an invoice in the sum of 82,970.28 USD. The applicant claimed to have credited payment through bankin g channels to the account of the respondent maintained with the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. A dispute arose as the respondent contended that it had not received the pay ment. It then transpired that, the amount so credited was frau dulently siphoned off and, thus, the matter was reported to t he police.

Eventually, the respondent invoked the arbitration leading to the appointment of a sole arbitrator by this Court.

3. Upon conclusion of the arbitral process, the sole arbitrator passed an award on 30 th June, 2025. A signed copy of the said award was received by the Ms. Rita Joshi, the Advocate for the applicant on 2 nd July, 2025. The applicant claims that, Ms.

Joshi emailed the said award to a member of the applican t's legal team, yet, on account of technical issues the e mail could be opened on 3rd July, 2025 only. Thus, the applicant received a copy of the award on 3rd July, 2025.

4. In the application, it is averred that the statutory pe riod of three months for challenging the award expired on 3 rd October 2025. A delay of about 30 has occurred in filing the pe tition on account of the complexity of the matter involving inter national cyber fraud. The applicant, being a public sector under taking, 2/22 -IA1273-2026.DOC was required to obtain multiple administrative and legal clearances, including a formal legal opinion and approvals from the competent authorities. Furthermore, as the applican t was involved in the organization of the “Indian Maritime Week”, wherein delegates from 75 countries and the high dignita ries had participated, there was delay in filing the petition.

5. The respondent-claimant has resisted the application by filing an affidavit-in-reply. At the outset, it was controverted that the award was received by the applicant on 3 rd July, 2025. The award was, in fact, received by the applicant on 2 nd July, 2025.

If three months period is computed from 2 nd July, 2025, the filing of the petition on 3 rd November, 2025 is clearly beyond the prescribed period of three months and 30 days period, which can be condoned by the Court. Secondly, the very fa ctum of filing of the petition on 3 rd November, 2025 was put in contest.

An endeavour was made to demonstrate that there were apparent inconsistencies in the claim of the applicant as regards the filing of the petition on 3 rd November, 2025. In any event, even if it is assumed that the award was receiv ed by the applicant on 3 rd July, 2025, yet, the filing of the petition on 3 rd November, 2025 would still be barred by two days.

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6. The applicant filed an additional affidavit to assert that, since the further 30 days period expired on 2 nd November, 2025 which was a Court holiday, the filing of the petition on 3rd November, 2025 was within the extendable period of 30 days, and as the applicant has ascribed justifiable reasons, th e delay deserved to be condoned.

7. I have heard Mr. Satish Upadhyay, the learned Counsel for the applicant/petitioner, and Mr. Jamsheed Master, the l earned Counsel for the respondent, at some length. With the assistance of the learned Counsel for the parties, I have perused the material on record.

8. Mr. Upadhyay, the learned Counsel for the applicant, would submit that though the receipt of the copy of t he award by the Advocate of the applicant on 2 nd July, 2025 is not in dispute, yet, the applicant has placed credible material on record to show that the copy of the said award sent by email by Advocate Joshi could only be opened on 3 rd July, 2025. Thus, the prescribed period of three months for filing the petition expired on 3 rd October, 2025. Consequently, the extendable 30 days period would expire on 2nd November, 2025. Since 2nd November, 2025 happened to be Sunday, the filing of the petition on 3rd November, 2025 was within the combined 4/22 -IA1273-2026.DOC prescribed and extendable period. Support was sought to be drawn from the provisions contained in Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, whereunder, if the prescribed period expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, a ppeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the Court reopens.

9. Mr. Upadhyay further submitted that in the application for condonation of delay the applicant has ascribed justifiable reasons. Emphasis was laid on the fact that the applic ant, being a public sector undertaking, was required to obtain approvals from the competent authorities, and the said process took time. Secondly, as the applicant was the organizer of “Indian Maritime Week 2025”, an event of a global scale, the time and resources of the applicant were employed for the successful organization of the said event. In these circumstances, Mr. Upadhyay would urge, if the delay is not condoned, the applicant would suffer an irreparable loss as the applicant has already parted with the amount under invoice.

10. Per contra, Mr. Master, the learned Counsel for the respondent, would submit that the application suffers f rom the vice of suppression of facts and lack of bona fides. Taking the Court through the averments in the petition and applicat ion, 5/22 -IA1273-2026.DOC the manner of affirmation of the petition and the applica tion and the assertions therein, Mr. Master would urge that , the proceeding has been filed by the applicant in a most cas ual manner. The very filing of the petition on 3 rd November, 2025, according to Mr. Master, is not free from infirmities.

11. Mr. Master would further urge, even if it is assumed t hat the petition was filed on 3 rd November, 2025, yet, on the own showing of the applicant, the prescribed and the exten dable period of 30 days expired on 2 nd November, 2025. Mr. Master would submit, once this position is conceded, the petitio n does not deserve to be countenanced as the benefit of the provisions contained in Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be claimed in respect of the extendable period of 30 days. The provisions contained in Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 196 3, come into play only when the prescribed period expires on a day when the Court is closed.

12. Mr. Master would urge that, the aforesaid position in law is no longer res integra. In a series of judgments, the Supreme Court has emphasized that, the benefit of the provisions contained in Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be claimed where the extendable period of 30 days expires on a day when the Court is closed. Reliance was placed on the de cisions 6/22 -IA1273-2026.DOC in the cases of Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. Subhash Projects and Marketing Limited1, Bhimashankar Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Niyamit Limited vs. Walchandnagar Industries Limited2 and My preferred Transformation and Hospitality Private Limited vs. M/s. Faridabad Implements Private Limited3.

13. The aforesaid submissions now fall for consideration.

14. Under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, an application for setting aside an arbitral award may not be made after three months has elapsed from the date on which the party making that application has received the arbitral award.

Under the proviso to sub-section (3), the Court may ent ertain the application within the further period of 30 days, bu t not thereafter, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by a sufficient cause from making the application within the prescribed period of three months.

15. It would be contextually relevant to note that, under Section 31(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, after the arbitral award is made, the Arbitral Tribunal is enjoined to de liver a signed copy of the arbitral award to each party. A conjoint 1 (2012) 1 SCR 403.

2 (2023) 8 SCC 453.

3 (2025) 1 SCR 729.

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reading of sub-section (5) of Section 31 with Section 34(3 ) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, would make it clear that the limita tion prescribed for filing a petition to set aside the award un der Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would commence from the date a signed copy of the arbitral award is delivere d to the party that makes an application for setting aside the same.

16. In the light of the aforesaid statutory prescription, t wo dates assume critical salience. First, the date on which the signed copy of the arbitral award is delivered to the pa rty, who files a petition to set aside the said award. Second, th e date on which such petition is filed before the Court. The first date assumes importance from the perspective of the commencement of the period of limitation. The second date is also of immense significance to ascertain whether the petition is, in fact , filed within the prescribed period of three months (from the date of the commencement of the period of limitation) and the extendable 30 days period (albeit only upon the satisfactio n of the Court), as the Court is denuded of the power to c ondone the delay beyond the prescribed period of three months plus 30 days.

17. With the aforesaid preface, reverting to the facts of the case, it is pertinent to note the parties are not at is sue over to 8/22 -IA1273-2026.DOC fact that the award was passed on 30 th June, 2025 and its copy was received on 2nd July, 2025 by Mr. Subodh Shivam for Advocate Rita Joshi, who represented the applicant befor e the Arbitral Tribunal. The applicant, however, asserts that the copy of the said award forwarded by Advocate Rita Joshi b y email could be opened on 3 rd July, 2025 only, on account of technical issues. Thus, the applicant can be said to have recei ved the copy of the award on 3 rd July, 2025 only. Attention of the Court was invited to the internal correspondence to substan tiate the said claim.

18. It is imperative to note that, the applicant acknowledges if the prescribed period of three months is computed even from 3rd July, 2025, it expired on 3 rd October, 2025 and the 30 days extendable period expired on 2nd November, 2025. Since the said date happened to be a Sunday, the filing of the petition on the next working day, i.e. 3rd November, 2025, was in order in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is the substance of the claim of the applicant.

19. Even if maximum latitude is given to the claim of the applicant that, it had received the copy of the award from Advocate Rita Joshi on 3 rd July, 2025, and it is accepted at par;

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discounting the objections on behalf of the respondent to the acceptability of such contention, yet, in view of the settled position in law that the benefit of the provisions containe d in Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be availed only when the prescribed period expires on a day when the Court is closed, and not in respect of the extendable period of 30 days , the submission on behalf of the applicant does not merit countenance.

20. Mr. Master was justified in canvassing the submission that the position is no longer res integra and stands settled by a series of judgments of the Supreme Court. In the cas e of Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board (supra), the Supreme Court considered the precise submission, sought to be canvassed by Mr. Upadhyay in this case, premised on the applicability of the provisions contained in Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963. After adverting to the provisions contained in Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 and Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the Supreme Court enunciated that in view of the provisions contained in Section 2(j) of the Lim itation Act, 1963 which defines the term "period of limitation", in the context of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, it becomes amply clear that the prescribed period for making an application 10/22 -IA1273-2026.DOC for setting aside an arbitral award is three months. Th e period of 30 days mentioned in the proviso that follows sub-sec tion (3)

of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 is not “the p eriod of limitation” and, therefore, not the “prescribed period” for the purposes of making an application for setting aside arbitral award is three months. Thus, the period of 30 days b eyond three months which the Court may extend on the suffic ient cause being shown under the proviso appended to sub-s ection (3) of Section 34 of the Act, 1996 being not the “period of limitation” or, in other words, “prescribed period”, the provisions contained in Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, are no t at all attracted.

21. The aforesaid decision has been followed by the Supreme Court in the case of Bhimashankar Sahakari (supra). In the case of My preferred Transformation (supra), the Supreme Court again reiterated that Section 4 of the Limitation Act applie s in relation to the prescribed period of three months and it does not apply when the condonable period of 30 days expires o n a day when the Court is not working.

22. In view of the aforesaid legal position, an endeavour of Mr.

Upadhyay to draw support from the provisions contained in Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, cannot be acceded to. Had 11/22 -IA1273-2026.DOC that been the only issue, the matter could have been put to rest.

However, the uncontroverted facts of the case raise another issue of seminal significance which this Court cannot be oblivious of, while considering the aspect as to whether the petition under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 should be entertained.

23. In all fairness to the learned Counsel for the parties, it must be noted that Mr. Upadhyay adverted to the poin t which arises for consideration on a tangent. It was urged th at, the signed copy of the award was not served on the party – applicant. Mr. Upadhyay, however, did not pursue the said point further. Nonetheless, as noted above, the parties a re not at issues over the fact that the award was passed on 3 0th June, 2025 and its copy was received by a person on behalf o f the Advocate for the applicant on 2nd July, 2025.

24. It would be contextually relevant to note that, the cop y of the Minutes of the Meeting (Exhibit-B) was annexed to the affidavit-in-reply on behalf of the respondent. The said Minutes of the Meeting, inter alia, records that the award was passed on that day. It also contains an acknowledgment (on which reliance was placed by the respondent) that, a copy of the aw ard was received on 2 nd July, 2025 by Mr. Subodh Shivam for Ms. Rita 12/22 -IA1273-2026.DOC Joshi, Advocate. It appears that none had appeared for the applicant-respondent in the arbitral proceedings on 30 th June, 2025. On that day, Advocate Vaishnavi Tiwari had receiv ed the copy purportedly for the Advocate for the claimant. The Minutes of the Meeting dated 30 th June, 2025 and the acknowledgments thereon thus make it explicitly clear that the learned sole arbitrator professed to comply with the mandate contain ed in Section 31(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 by delivering a signed copy of the arbitral award to the Advocates for the parties, under their respective acknowledgments. It does not appear that the learned sole arbitrator had delivered a signed copy of the award to each of the parties in any other mode.

25. The question that thus wrenches to the fore is, wheth er there was compliance of the statutory mandate containe d in Section 31(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 and, consequ ently, the prescribed period of limitation for filing the petition u nder Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, commenced?

26. To retain emphasis, few provisions contained in the Arbitration Act, 1996 deserve to be extracted. Under Section 2(h), a party is defined as under:

“ 2(h) party means a party to an arbitration agreement;”

27. Relevant part of Section 31 reads as under:

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“31. Form and contents of arbitral award - (1) An arbitral award shall be made in writing and shall be signed by the members of the Arbitral Tribunal.

……..

(5) After the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party.”

28. Section 34, which is subsumed under Chapter VII, providing for a recourse against an arbitral award, rea ds as under:

“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award - (1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may b e made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).

….

(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the d ate on which that request had been disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal.”

29. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions would indicate that the aspect of receipt of the arbitral awa rd by the party, within the meaning of Section 2(h), is inextricably intermingled with the commencement of the prescribed pe riod of limitation for filing the petition under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1996. The obligation on the Arbitral Trib unal to deliver a signed copy of the arbitral award to each par ty is 14/22 -IA1273-2026.DOC required to be read in juxtaposition with the expression “t hree months from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award”. Thus it is the “receipt” of the arbitral award by the party that star ts the clock of limitation ticking.

30. Delivery of signed copy of the arbitral award is not only imperative from the point of view of conveying to the pa rties as to how the Arbitral Tribunal has resolved the dispute and why the Arbitral Tribunal has decided in favour of or aga inst the party, but also from the point of view of the commenc ement of the period of limitation especially in the context of the f act that beyond the prescribed period of three months and the extendable period of thirty days, even the Court has no jurisdiction to permit a party to assail the award by fili ng a petition. The service of the signed copy of the arbitral award on the party is therefore not an empty formality. The delivery of the signed copy of the arbitral award on a particular day has serious legal implications. Therefore, the question whet her the signed copy of the arbitral award has in fact been served upon a party thereto who has assailed the said award, and, if so, when, is of critical salience.

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31. A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case o f Union of India vs. Tecco Trichy Engineers and Contractors4, enunciated that the delivery of an arbitral award under sub- section (5) of Section 31 is not a matter of mere for mality. It is a matter of substance. It is only after the stage under Section 31 has passed that the stage of termination of arbitral p roceedings within the meaning of Section 32 of the Act arises. The delivery of arbitral award to the party, to be effective, has to be “received”

by the party. This delivery by the Arbitral Tribunal an d receipt by the party of the award set in motion several periods of limitation such as an application for correction and interpretation of an award within 30 days under Section 33(1), an application for making an additional award, and an application for setting aside an award under Section 34(3) . As this delivery of the copy of award has the effect of conferring certain rights on the party as also bringing to an end t he right to exercise those rights on expiry of the prescribed p eriod of limitation which would be calculated from that date, the delivery of the copy of award by the tribunal and the receipt thereof by each party constitutes an important stage in the arbitral proceedings.

4 (2005) 4 SCC 239.

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32. In the case of State of Maharashtra and Others vs. ARK Builders Private Limited5, the Supreme Court was confronted with the following question. "

“2. Whether the period of limitation for making an application under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter `the Act') for settin g aside an arbitral award is to be reckoned from the date a c opy of the award is received by the objector by any means and from any source, or it would start running from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered to him by the arbitrator?

33. After an analysis of the provisions contained in the A ct, 1996, including Sections 31 and 34, the Supreme Court enunciated that the expression “party making the applic ation had received the arbitral award” cannot be read in isolation, and it must be understood in the light of what is said earlie r in Section 31(5), that requires a signed copy of the awar d to be delivered to each party. Reading the two provisions tog ether, it is quite clear that the limitation prescribed in Section 34 (3)

would commence only from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered to the party making the application for sett ing the award aside.

34. After making a reference to the decision in the case of Tecco Trichy Engineers and Others (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated the legal position as under:

5 (2011) 4 SCC 616.

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“15. The highlighted portion of the judgment extracted above, leaves no room for doubt that the period of limit ation prescribed under section 34(3) of the Act would start running only from the date a signed copy of the award is deliver ed to/received by the party making the application for sett ing it aside under section 34(1) of the Act. The legal position on the issue may be stated thus. If the law prescribes that a copy of the order/award is to be communicated, delivered, dispatched, forwarded, rendered or sent to the parties concerned in a particular way and in case the law also sets a period of limitation for challenging the order/award in question by the aggrieved party, then the period of lim itation can only commence from the date on which the order/awa rd was received by the party concerned in the manner prescribed by the law.

…...

17. In light of the discussions made above we find the impugned order of the Bombay High Court unsustainable.

The High Court was clearly in error not correctly following the decision of this Court in Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors and in taking a contrary view. The High Cour t overlooked that what section 31(5) contemplates is not merely the delivery of any kind of a copy of the award but a copy of the award that is duly signed by the members of the ar bitral tribunal.”

35. The decision in the case of Benarsi Krishna Committee and others vs. Karmyogi Shelters Private Limited6, appears to be on all four with the facts of the case on hand. In th at case also, the copies of the award duly signed by the learned arbit rator were received by the Counsel for the respective parties. A learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court had dismissed the petition under Section 34 on the premise that the expre ssion “party” under Section 31(5) of the Arbitration Act, 199 6, would also include the agent of the party and thus since the award was received by the Counsel for the respondent there in on 13 th 6 (2012) 9 SCC 496.

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May, 2004, the petition filed on 3 rd February, 2005 was time barred. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court interfe red with the said order opining that, a copy of the award h ad to be delivered to the party itself and service on its Counsel did not amount to service within the meaning of Section 31(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1996.

36. Before the Supreme Court, it was contended that in vie w of the authority which a party confers on an Advocate , the term ‘party’ would include the Advocate, to whom the signed copy of the award is delivered. The Supreme Court repelled the submission and concurred with the view of the Division Ben ch of the Delhi High Court observing inter alia as under:

“15. Having taken note of the submissions advanced on behalf of the respective parties and having particular r egard to the expression “party” as defined in Section 2(h) of the 1996 Act read with the provisions of Sections 31(5) and 34(3)

of the 1996 Act, we are not inclined to interfere with the decision of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court impugned in these proceedings. The expression “party” h as been amply dealt with in Tecco Trechy Engineers’s case (supra) and also in ARK Builders Pvt. Ltd.’s case (supra), referred to hereinabove. It is one thing for an Advoc ate to act and plead on behalf of a party in a proceeding and it is another for an Advocate to act as the party himself. The expression “party”, as defined in Section 2(h) of the 1996 Act, clearly indicates a person who is a party to an arbitrat ion agreement. The said definition is not qualified in any way so as to include the agent of the party to such agreeme nt. Any reference, therefore, made in Section 31(5) and Section 34(2)

of the 1996 Act can only mean the party himself and n ot his or her agent, or Advocate empowered to act on the b asis of a Vakalatnama. In such circumstances, proper compliance with Section 31(5) would mean delivery of a signed copy of th e Arbitral Award on the party himself and not on his Advo cate, 19/22 -IA1273-2026.DOC which gives the party concerned the right to proceed under Section 34(3) of the aforesaid Act .”

(emphasis supplied)

37. The aforesaid decisions were referred to by another tw o- Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel vs. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel and others7. In that case, without deviating from the enunciation of law in the aforesaid cases, on facts, the Supreme Court found t hat the appellant therein had received the copy of the award wit h an endorsement for himself and on behalf of his family membe rs and that constituted, in the attendant circumstances of the said case, a due service of the copy of the arbitral award on the parties thereto.

38. A Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Health Care Medical and Diagnostics Services vs. Amulya Investments8, has postulated that the provisions contained in Sections 2(1)(h), 31(5) and 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, have been interpreted to have a mandatory effect, and hence st rict and complete compliance thereof would be necessary.

39. The legal position which thus emerges is that, the obligation on the Arbitral Tribunal is to deliver a signed copy of the arbitral award to each of the parties to the arbitral 7 (2018) 15 SCC 178.

8 Arbitration Appeal No.15397 of 2024.

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proceedings. Delivery of the signed copy of the arbitral award to an agent, or for that matter even an Advocate, of t he party, does not amount to scrupulous compliance of the mandatory requirement. The insistence on the scrupulous compliance with the requirement to deliver a signed copy of the arbitra l award stems from the consequences that emanate from the r eceipt of the signed copy of the arbitral award by a party. As strict timelines are prescribed for initiating further measures, if the parties desire to initiate such measures, upon receipt o f the signed copy of the arbitral award, any deviation from the obligation to deliver the signed copy of the award is not countenanced. The fact that, the aggrieved party somehow comes in possession of a copy of the arbitral award fr om any source is not of material significance. The delivery of a signed copy of an arbitral award by the arbitrator is the mandate of the law. There is clear and present risk if any deviation is countenanced as that would open the arena for assert ions and counter assertions and thereby obfuscate the matter, which is otherwise clear and unambiguous.

40. Applying these principles to the facts of the case at h and, evidently, the learned sole arbitrator did not deliver the signed copy of the arbitral award to the applicant. Copy of the arbitral 21/22 -IA1273-2026.DOC award was received by Mr. Subodh Shivam on behalf of Ms. Rita Joshi, Advocate. That did not constitute the discharge of the statutory obligation to deliver a signed copy of the arbitral award to the party. Resultantly, the period of limitation presc ribed for filing the petition cannot be said to have commenced fro m 2 nd July, 2025, in the strict sense of the term. In the a bsence of any other credible material to show that the learned arbitrator delivered the signed copy of the arbitral award at any later point of time, the presentation of the petition on 3 rd November, 2025 cannot be said to be barred by the limitation, postulated under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1996.

41. For the foregoing reasons, the application deserves to be allowed by making a declaration that the petition filed on 3rd November, 2025, is not time barred.

42. Hence, the following order:

: O R D E R :

(i) The application stands allowed.

(ii) It is declared that the petition filed on 3 rd November, 2025 is not time-barred.

(iii) The petition be registered and listed for admission on 1 4th October, 2026.

[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]

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