Bombay High Court judgment of 8 Oct 2026

904-APEAL-218-2026.doc

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIRCUIT BENCH AT KOLHAPUR CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CR. APPEAL NO. 218 OF 2026 Nilesh Vithoba Gadade ...Appellant Versus The State Of Maharashtra ...Respondent —————— Mr. Abad Ponda, Senior Counsel i/b Mr. Pritesh A. Khara de, Mr. Sajid A. Bagwan, Sumit Tiwari , Samyak Bhatkar for the Appellant.

Mr. Shishir. S. Hiray, Chief PP a/w Mahalaxmi Ganpathy Addl. PP & Smt. S. N.

Deshmukh, APP for the Respondent-State.

——————

Coram : Sharmila U. Deshmukh &

Neeraj P. Dhote, JJ.

Date : October 08, 2026.

FINAL ORDER : (Per Neeraj P. Dhote J.)

1. Considering the issue involved and by consent of both sid es, the appeal is heard inally at the admission stage.

2. This is an Appeal under Section 12 of the Maharashtra Contro l of Organized Crime Act, 1999 ( for short “MCOCA”) against the order dated 8th September, 2026 granting 90 days extension to complete the investigation, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge, (MCOCA Court), Sangli below Remand Appli cation dated 07th September, 2026 in respect of accused Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5 , 6, 8 and 9 in C.R. No. 235 of 2026 registered with Sanjaynagar Police Stat ion, District Harish 1 of 22 HARISH VITHAL CHAUDHARI Digitally signed by HARISH VITHAL CHAUDHARI Date:

2026.10.08

19:26:53 +0530

904-APEAL-218-2026.doc

Sangli for the ofences punishable under Sections 103(1) , 189(4), 332(a)

(c), 49 and 13 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Sect ions 3, 5, 25, and 27 of the Arms Act; Sections 37(1)(3)/135 and 142 of the Maharashtra Police Act; and Sections 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii), 3(2) , 3(4), and 4 of the MCOCA.

3. The prosecution's case, as stated in paragraph No. 4 of the ap peal memo, is reproduced below:

“(a) It is the prosecution case that the First Inform ant, Sandeep Balu Bandgar, is the son of Vithal @ Balu Bandgar, a former labour (hamali) union representative at the Sangli Mar ket Yard, and the nephew of Maruti Bandgar, a Director of the Sangli Krishi Utpanna Bazar Samiti. The prosecution al leges that the First Informant has known the Appellant for abo ut 10-12 years, from the period when the Appellant was working at the said Market Yard, and was acquainted with Accused Nos. 02 to 05.

(b) It is further the prosecution's case that on 10/0 6/2026, in the evening, the Appellant went to the residence of o ne Laxman Kharat, a labour mukadam at Aurangabad Railw ay Station, Taluka Jat, and allegedly ired gunshots ne ar his residence and demanded that Kharat either vacate the railway-station labour contract or pay an amount of Rs.10,00,000/-, failing which he would be killed. It is alleged that on 11/06/2026 at about 08.00 hours, Balu Bandga r and Maruti Bandgar accompanied Kharat to Jat Police Station to lodge a complaint in that regard and that , at about 16.30 hours on the same day, the Appellant came to the police station and allegedly confronted them and warned them to stay out of the matter.

(c) It is the prosecution's further case that on 1 1.06.2026 at about 18.15 hours, the Appellant, along with Accused N os.

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2 to 5, allegedly went to the residence of the compl ainant in a black Thar-type SUV. It is alleged that the Appel lant entered the compound, inquired about Balu Bandgar, caught hold of his minor son, Vedant Maruti Bandgar , aged about 14 years, and allegedly ired a pistol shot at his head from close range, resulting in his death. Accused N os. 02 and 03 are alleged to have provided cover with weapon s, while Accused Nos. 04 and 05 are alleged to have threatened the persons present at the spot. Thereafter , all the accused are alleged to have led from the spot in the said vehicle.”

4. The Appellant is arraigned as accused No. 1 in the aforesaid crime.

He was arrested on 14 th June 2026 and produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Sangli on 15 th June, 2026 and remanded to police custody till 18 th June, 2026. Thereafter, by an order dated 18 th June, 2026, the Appellant's police custody was further extended till 20th June, 2026. Thereafter, by an order dated 20th June, 2026, the Appellant came to be remanded to judicial custody.

5. On 08th July, 2026, pursuant to the approval accorded by the Special Inspector General of Police, Kolhapur Range, the aforesaid sections under MCOCA came to be added in the aforesaid C.R. and the matter came to be transferred to the ile of the Special Ju dge, MCOCA, Sangli. On 18 th August, 2026, the Appellant was produced before the Special Judge, MCOCA, and was remanded to police custody till 24 th August, 2026. Thereafter, by an order dated 24th August, 2024, the Appellant was remanded to judicial custody till 07 th September, 2026.

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On 07 th September, 2026, the Investigating Oicer submitted a rep ort before the learned Special Judge, MCOCA, Sangli seeking e xtension of the period for completion of investigation and iling of the charge-sheet by a further period of 90 days from 10 th September, 2026 under Section 21(2)(b) of the MCOCA. The Special Judge, MCOCA, Sang li issued notice to the accused persons, which came to be served on 08 th September, 2026. The Special Judge, MCOCA, Sangli passed the impugne d order allowing the report submitted by the prosecution and extended the period for completion of investigation and iling of the char ge-sheet for a further period of 90 days from 10th September, 2026 6. It is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the Appe llant that, the application submitted for extension of time was prep ared and presented by the Investigating Oicer, which merely records that it was presented through the Special Public Prosecutor (SPP), who signed the same and stated that he has iled the same . There was no endorsement of whatsoever nature on the application or on any other contemporaneous document demonstrating that the Special Public Prosecutor had perused the application, examined the papers and material collected during the investigation, had independent ly applied his mind to the question whether further detention of the accused was necessary for completion of investigation, had himself arrived at the satisfaction contemplated by Section 21(2)(b) of the MCOCA, had Harish 4 of 22 904-APEAL-218-2026.doc instructed the Investigating Oicer to ile the application, h ad settled, vetted, or approved the contents of the application, or had otherwise independently considered and endorsed the request for extension. The said omission assumes considerable signiicance, as the application under Section 21(2)(b) of the MCOCA requires the Public Prosecutor to apply his mind independently to the material and to the ne cessity for further detention and continuation of investigation. The said requirement was not satisied in the case at hand. The satisfaction and the application of mind by the Public Prosecutor must be relected from the record and cannot be supplied subsequently by oral asse rtions. The defect cannot be cured by a subsequent oral assertions t hat the Special Public Prosecutor had perused the papers, discussed with the Investigating Oicer, suggested alterations or modiications, and thereafter directed the Investigating Oicer to ile the appl ication. The learned Special Court ought to have examined the application as it stood when it was presented, and not by reference to subsequent explanations or oral submissions seeking to establish that, certain st eps were taken by the learned Special Public Prosecutor but were not recorded anywhere on the contemporaneous record. The o mission was signiicant. Mere presence of the Special Public Prosecutor in the court was not suicient. The extension granted by the learned Sp ecial Court was mechanical and against the settled position under the law. In Harish 5 of 22 904-APEAL-218-2026.doc support of his submissions, he relied on the decisions in:

i. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur And Another v. State of Mahar ashtra And Others, [(1994) 4 SCC 602];

ii. Darshan Subhash Nandagawali v. State of Maharashtra, Through Police Station Oicer, [2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1162];

iii.Shaikh Moin Shaikh Mehmood v. State of Maharashtra, Through Ramtirth Police Station, [2020 SCC OnLine Bom 968];

iv.Akshay Mahadeo Kamble v. State of Maharashtra, Through Secretary and Others, [2026 SCC OnLine Bom 158];

v. State of Maharashtra v. Surendra Pundalik Gadling and Others, [(2019) 5 SCC 178].

7. It is submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor that, the ai davit of the Sub-Divisional Police Oicer, Miraj Division, District Sang li, was submitted in the Appeal. He submitted that there is no spec iic format under the law for an application seeking extension of time t o complete the investigation and ile the charge-sheet. The report submitted by the Investigating Oicer was scrutinized by the Special Public Prosec utor before submitting to the learned Special Judge, MCOCA, Sang li. During submissions, the learned Public Prosecutor though tendered ac ross the Bar a copy of the same aidavit along with a copy of the repo rt dated 05th September, 2026 under the signature of the Sub-Divisional Po lice Oicer, Miraj Division, addressed to the Special Public Prosecutor before the learned Special Court, he fairly admitted that t he said report Harish 6 of 22 904-APEAL-218-2026.doc was not placed before the learned Special Judge. He submitt ed that in the judgment of Surendra Gadling (supra), the Apex Court carved out an exception and the ratio will not apply to the case at hand as there are two reports in this case. He further fairly admitted that the impugned order was passed on the report dated 07 th September, 2026, which was at page Nos. 125 to 142.

8. The only aspect to be considered and decided in the present appeal is whether the report submitted before the learned Special Judge, Sangli for extension of time to complete the investigation was as per the requirement of Section 21 of the MCOCA. The said provision is quoted below:

“21. Modiied application of certain provisions of the Code (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or in any other law, every ofence punishable under this Act, shall be deemed to be a cognizable ofence within the meaning of clause (c) o f section 2 of the Code and "cognizable case" as deined in that cl ause shall be construed accordingly.

(2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an ofence punishable under this Act subject to th e modiications that, in sub-section (2),- (a) the references to "ifteen days," and "sixty days ,"

wherever they occur, shall be construed as references to "thirty days" and "ninety days", respectively;

(b) after the proviso, the following proviso shall be inserted, namely:- Provided further that if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of ninety days, the Spe cial Court shall extend the said period upto one hundred and eighty days, on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the speciic reasons fo r the detention of the accused beyond the said period of ninety days.

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(3) Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in r elation to any case involving the arrest of any person on an acc usation of having committed an ofence punishable under this Act.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no p erson accused of an ofence punishable under this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond, unless- (a) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity t o oppose the application of such release; and (b) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application , the Court is satisied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such ofence and that h e is not likely to commit any ofence while on bail.

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, the accused shall not be granted bail if it is noticed by the Court that he was on bail in an ofence under this Act, or under any other Act , on the date of the ofence in question.

(6) The limitations on granting of bail speciied in sub-sect ion (4)

are in addition to the limitations under the Code or any other law for the time being in force on the granting of bail.

(7) The police oicer seeking the custody of any person for pre- indictment or pre-trial interrogation from the judicial custody shall ile a written statement explaining the reason for seeking s uch custody and also for the delay, if any, in seeking the police custody.”

9. Perusal of the aforesaid decisions cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant shows that, the position under th e law in respect of the issue involved in this Appeal is well settled.

10. In Hitendra Vishnu Thakur (supra), the case was under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA). One of the question for consideration was about the true ambit and scope of Section 20(4) and Section 20(8) of the TADA in the matte r of grant of bail to an accused brought before the Designated Court and the factors which the Designated Court has to keep in view while dealing wit h an Harish 8 of 22 904-APEAL-218-2026.doc application for grant of bail under Section 20(4) and for grant of extension of time to the prosecution for further investigation under clause (bb) of Section 20(4) and incidentally whether the conditions contained in Section 20(8) of the TADA control the gr ant of bail under Section 20(4) of the Act. The observation in para 19 of the said judgment shows that, Section 20(4) of the TADA made Section 167 of Cr.P.C. applicable in relation to case involving an ofence punishable under TADA, subject to the modiications speciied therein. After clause (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 20 of TADA, another c lause (bb) was inserted, which reads as under :

“(bb) in sub-section (2), after the proviso, the followin g proviso shall be inserted, namely:- ‘Provided further that, if it is not possible to complet e the investigation within the said period of one hundred and eighty days, the Designated Court shall extend the said period up to one year, on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the speciic reasons f or the detention of the accused beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty days; and' ".

Considering the said clause (bb), following observations were made:

“23. We may at this stage, also on a plain reading of clause (bb) of sub-section (4) of Section 20, point out that the Legislature has provided for seeking extension of time for completion of investigation on a report of the public prosecutor. The Legislature did not purposely leave it to an investigating oicer to make an application for seeking extension of time from the court. This provision is in tun e with the legislative intent to have the investigations completed exp editiously and not to allow an accused to be kept in continued det ention during unnecessary prolonged investigation at the whims of the police. The Legislature expects that the investigation must be completed with Harish 9 of 22 904-APEAL-218-2026.doc utmost promptitude but where it becomes necessary to seek some more time for completion of the investigation, the investigating agency must submit itself to the scrutiny of the public pro secutor in the irst instance and satisfy him about the progress of the investigation and furnish reasons for seeking further custod y of an accused. A public prosecutor is an important oicer of the State Government and is appointed by the State under the Code of Criminal Procedure. He is not a part of the investigating agency. He is an independent statutory authority. The public prosecutor is expected to independently apply his mind to the request of the investigating agency before submitting a report to the court for exten sion of time with a view to enable the investigating agency to complete the investigation. He is not merely a post oice or a forwar ding agency. A public prosecutor may or may not agree with the reasons given by the investigating oicer for seeking extension of time and may i nd that the investigation had not progressed in the proper manner or that there has been unnecessary, deliberate or avoidable d elay in completing the investigation. In that event, he may not submit any report to the court under clause (bb) to seek extension of time. Thus, for seeking extension of time under clause (bb), the public prosecutor after an independent application of his mind to the reque st of the investigating agency is required to make a report to the Des ignated Court indicating therein the progress of the investigation a nd disclosing justiication for keeping the accused in further custody to enable the investigating agency to complete the investigatio n. The public prosecutor may attach the request of the investiga ting oicer along with his request or application and report, but h is report, as envisaged under clause (bb), must disclose on the face of it that he has applied his mind and was satisied with the progress of th e investigation and considered grant of further time to comp lete the investigation necessary. The use of the expression "on t he report of the public prosecutor indicating the progress of the invest igation and the speciic reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period" as occurring in clause (bb) in sub-section (2) of Sec tion 167 as amended by Section 20(4) are important and indicative of t he legislative intent not to keep an accused in custody unreas onably and to grant extension only on the report of the public pro secutor. The report of the public prosecutor, therefore, is not mere ly a formality but a very vital report, because the consequence of its acceptance afects the liberty of an accused and it must, therefore, strictly comply with the requirements as contained in clause (bb). The req uest of an investigating oicer for extension of time is no substitute for the report of the public prosecutor. Where either no report as is envisaged by clause (bb) is iled or the report iled by the publ ic prosecutor is not accepted by the Designated Court, since the grant of extension of time under clause (bb) is neither a formality nor automatic, the necessary corollary would be that an accused would be entitled t o seek bail and Harish 10 of 22 904-APEAL-218-2026.doc the court 'shall' release him on bail if he furnishes ba il as required by the Designated Court. It is not merely the question of fo rm in which the request for extension under clause (bb) is made but one of substance. The contents of the report to be submitted by the public prosecutor, after proper application of his mind, are designed to assist the Designated Court to independently decide whether or not extension should be granted in a given case. Keeping in view the consequences of the grant of extension i.e. keeping an accused in further custody, the Designated Court must be satisied for the justiication, from the report of the public prosecutor, to grant extension of time to complete the investigation. Where th e Designated Court declines to grant such an extension, the right to be released on bail on account of the 'default' of the prosecution becomes indefeasible and cannot be defeated by reason s other than those contemplated by sub-section (4) of Section 20 as d iscussed in the earlier part of this judgment. We are unable to agree with Mr Madhava Reddy or the Additional Solicitor General Mr T ulsi that even if the public prosecutor 'presents' the request of the investigating oicer to the court or 'forwards' the request of the investigating oicer to the court, it should be construed to be the r eport of the public prosecutor. There is no scope for such a construc tion when we are dealing with the liberty of a citizen. The courts ar e expected to zealously safeguard his liberty. Clause (bb) has to be read and interpreted on its plain language without addition or substitu tion of any expression in it. We have already dealt with the importance of the report of the public prosecutor and emphasised that he is neither a 'post oice' of the investigating agency nor its 'forwardin g agency' but is charged with a statutory duty. He must apply his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and his report mus t disclose on the face of it that he had applied his mind to the twin conditions contained in clause (bb) of sub-section (4) of Section 20. Since the law requires him to submit the report as envisaged by the section, he must act in the manner as provided by the section and in no other manner.

A Designated Court which overlooks and ignores the requirem ents of a valid report fails in the performance of one of its e ssential duties and renders its order under clause (bb) vulnerable. Wheth er the public prosecutor labels his report as a report or as an application for extension, would not be of much consequence so long as it demonstrates on the face of it that he has applied his mind and is satisied with the progress of the investigation and the genuineness of the reasons for grant of extension to keep an accused in further custody as envisaged by clause (bb) (supra). Even the mere reproduction of the application or request of the investiga ting oicer by the public prosecutor in his report, without demonstra tion of the application of his mind and recording his own satisfaction , would not render his report as the one envisaged by clause (bb) a nd it would not be a proper report to seek extension of time. In the absence of an Harish 11 of 22 904-APEAL-218-2026.doc appropriate report the Designated Court would have no jurisdiction to deny to an accused his indefeasible right to be released on bail on account of the default of the prosecution to ile the challan within the prescribed time if an accused seeks and is prepared to furnish the bail bonds as directed by the court. Moreover, no extension can be granted to keep an accused in custody beyond the prescribed pe riod except to enable the investigation to be completed and as already stated before any extension is granted under clause (bb), the accused must be put on notice and permitted to have his say so as to be able to object to the grant of extension.”

11. In Shaikh Moin Shaikh Mehmood (supra), the order impugned was by the Trial Court allowing the application for extension o f time to ile the charge-sheet in the crime registered under the provisions of Indian Penal Code, Arms Act and MCOCA. It was the case of the Ap pellant therein that, the report for extension of time to ile t he charge-sheet did not satisfy the requirement of Section 21(2)(b) of MCOCA. This Court, considering the earlier judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court, observed that Section 21(2)(b) of the MCOCA and Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA were practically identical and Section 49(2)(b) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, which replaced the TAD A Act, also carried the identical provision. Considering the issue involved therein, it was observed as under :

“21. Notwithstanding the strenuous submissions of the lear ned APP- Shri San Shri Sangle, we ind in the case in hand, the application tendered "through the APP" can be hardly said to be a report of the prosecutor. A representative of the Police Station, Ramt irth is shown to have signed below the said application. In fact, the certiied copy of the application placed before us indicates that no authority has signed below the said application and the prosecutor has signed the said application which hardly could be said to be his report.

22. In the light of the above, we deem it advantageous, for the beneit of the litigants and the lawyers, to observe that a re port as Harish 12 of 22 904-APEAL-218-2026.doc understood under the above reproduced provisions of the various enactments, has to be an independent report comprising of (a)

reasons evidencing the personal satisfaction of the pu blic prosecutor as regards the progress in investigation made, (b) the reasons for which the investigation could not be completed and (c) t he object to be achieved through investigation for which an extended pe riod of time is necessary. These ingredients have to form a part of the report of the prosecutor and he has to tender the said repor t to the Special Court under his signature. It cannot be in the form of a m iscellaneous application to be iled for seeking extension of time. In addition to his report, he should append the report of the Investigatio n Agency so as to convince the Special Court that extension needs to be granted.”

12. In Darshan Subhash Nandagawali (supra), the Appellant was one of the accused in the crime registered for the ofences punishable under the Indian Penal Code, Arms Act and MCOCA. The challeng e in the said Appeal was to the orders passed by the Trial Court extendi ng the time for investigation. This Court considering the decision in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur (supra), made the following observation:

“8. We had an opportunity to peruse the applications i led by the learned Public Prosecutor before the Special Court on 07 .11.2022 and second application dated 07.01.2023, with the copies of applications produced along with the Pursis dated 19.04.2023, which were addressed by the Investigating Oicer to the Public Pros ecutor attached to the Special Court, dated 05.11.2022 and 06.01.2023. On minute observations, we are surprised to know that all th e contents word by word, paragraph by paragraph, including full stops and commas, in these applications are identically the same. Thus, the only conclusion which could be drawn is that application which was forwarded by the Investigating Oicer on 05.11.2022 add ressed to the Public Prosecutor attached to the Special Court, is c opied word by word and paragraph by paragraph in the application addr essed to the Special Court dated 07.11.2022 by the Public Prosecutor . This application presented before the Special Court is jointl y signed by the Investigating Oicer and Public Prosecutor attached to the Special Court.

11. The above dictum as laid down by the Apex Court cle arly goes to show that the duty of the Public Prosecutor attached t o the Special Harish 13 of 22 904-APEAL-218-2026.doc Court is something special in which he has to apply his min d independently and satisfy himself as to whether there is actually need for extension of time to ile charge-sheet. Only then the Public Prosecutor, after verifying the case papers and reason s given by the Investigating Oicer, may apply by submitting his report to the Special Court for such extension. The Public Prosecutor along wit h his report may attach the request of the Investigating Oicer made to him, but he has to apply his mind and demonstrate by giving his re asons as to why he is supporting the contentions raised by the Investigating Oicer for extension of time.

12. The Apex Court very clearly observed in the abov e quoted paragraph 23 that the Public Prosecutor may label his r eport as a report or as an application for extension and it would not be of much consequence, so long as it demonstrates on the face o f it, that the Public Prosecutor has applied his mind and he is satisied with the progress of the investigation, the genuineness of the reasons for grant of extension thereby keeping accused in further custody. However, mere reproduction of the application or request of the Investigating Oicer by the Public Prosecutor in his report, without demo nstration of the application of his mind and recording his own satisfaction, would not render his report as the one envisaged in cl ause (b) proviso of Section 21(b) and it would not be a proper report to seek extension of time. Likewise, in absence of an appropriate report, the Designated Court would have no jurisdiction to deny to an accused his indefeasible right to be released on bail on account of d efault of the prosecution to ile challan within the prescribed time, if the accused is ready and willing to furnish bail bonds. The Court is duty bound to protect the rights of accused and also to follow the law laid down and no extension can be granted beyond the prescribed per iod without following such law laid down under Section 21 and by the Apex Court in various decisions.”

13. In Akshay Mahadeo Kamble (supra), the order impugned was passed by the Trial Court granting extension of 90 days soug ht by the Investigating Oicer for completing the investigation and iling the charge-sheet. One of the ground raised in the Appeal was that, the application for extension of time was not iled by the Public Prosecutor but was iled by the Investigating Oicer through the APP with out his signature. This Court considering the provisions of Section 21 of the Harish 14 of 22 904-APEAL-218-2026.doc MCOCA, made the following observations :

11. In support of the aforesaid grounds the learned coun sel for the appellant heavily relied on the judgments of this Cou rt as well as Hon'ble Apex Court. In Criminal Appeal No. 732 of 2018 (supra), following observation is made by this Court.

"Both the applications iled under Section 21 of the MCOC Act, were addressed to the learned Special Judge, but the applications were prepared and signed by the investigating oicer, Sub-Divisional Police Oicer, Sub Division Osmanabad.

On the application dated 18 th September, 2018, there is signature of Motichand Rathod, SDPO and on the left side of this signature, there is signature of Special Prosecutor appointed by the State showing that through Special Prosecutor applicatio n was presented before the learned Special Judge by SDPO. T he contents of the application also show that the applic ation was drafted, prepared by the investigating oicer. Except the signature of the learned Special Prosecutor on both the applications, there is nothing to show that the learne d Special Prosecutor has considered the contentions of the invest igating oicer made for getting extension of time and he was sat isied that there were reasons for extension of time. Thus, t he applications as they are, do not show that the Special Prosecutor had applied his mind, he was satisied about the grounds mentioned for getting extension of time. On the application dated 19 th September, 2018, in addition to the signature of the learned Special Prosecutor, two more words are written like "submitted by".

With this observation this Court had allowed the appeal setting aside the order of extension of time for investigation pas sed by the learned Special Judge in the said matter.

12. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on the judgment in of this court at Nagpur Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 43 of 2023 (supra), wherein following observation is made.

"We had an opportunity to peruse the applications iled b y the learned Public Prosecutor before the Special Court on 07.11.2022 and second application dated 07.01.2023, with the copies of applications produced along with the Pursis dated 19.04.2023, which were addressed by the Investigating O icer to the Public Prosecutor attached to the Special Court, dated 05.11.2022 and 06.01.2023. On minute observations, we are surprised to know that all the contents word by word, paragraph by paragraph, including full stops and commas, in these applications are identically the same. Thus, the only conclusion Harish 15 of 22 904-APEAL-218-2026.doc which could be drawn is that application which was forwar ded by the Investigating Oicer on 05.11.2022 addressed to the Public Prosecutor attached to the Special Court, is copied word by word and paragraph by paragraph in the application addressed to the Special Court dated 07.11.2022 by th e Public Prosecutor. This application presented before the Specia l Court is jointly signed by the Investigating Oicer and Public Prosecutor attached to the Special Court".

In the same judgment this Court has made reference to the observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602 1994 SCC (Cri) 1087 as follows:

"The above dictum as laid down by the Apex Court clear ly goes to show that the duty of the Public Prosecutor att ached to the Special Court is something special in which he has to a pply his mind independently and satisfy himself as to whether there is actually need for extension of time to ile charge-sheet . Only then the Public Prosecutor, after verifying the case pap ers and reasons given by the Investigating Oicer, may apply by submitting his report to the Special Court for such extension. The Public Prosecutor along with his report may attach the request of the Investigating Oicer made to him, but he has to ap ply his mind and demonstrate by giving his reasons as to why he is supporting the contentions raised by the Investigating Oic er for extension of time".

On going the above observations, it is clearly evident t hat the application/report for extension is supposed to be iled independently by the Special Public Prosecutor and it cannot be merely submitted by the Investigating Oicer through learned Special Prosecutor . It has been speciically observed that the request of Investigating Oicer for extension of time is no substitute for the report of Publ ic Prosecutor as per the proviso to Section 21 of MCOC Act. Moreover, in the light of observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Hitendra Thakur (supra), it has been laid down that the Public Prosecutor attached to the Special Court is having some special duty in which he h as to apply his mind independently and satisfy himself whether there is actual need for extension of time to ile charge-sheet. Only o n such satisfaction of Public Prosecutor after verifying the material on record, he shall submit report to the Special Court for such extension.

A duty is therefore cast upon the learned Prosecutor so attached, to apply his mind for seeking extension and that too after going through material on record. He cannot merely act as a post o ice. By observing this, the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court in the aforesaid judgments, have rejected the extension of time to ile charge-sheet, as prayed. The same view is reiterated by this Court in Harish 16 of 22 904-APEAL-218-2026.doc the case of Shaikh Moin v. State of Maharashtra in Criminal Appeal No. 502 of 2020 that how should be the approach of P ublic Prosecutor by making the following observation.

"In Asiam Babalal Desai (supra), Hon'ble Justice Ahmedi, speaking for the majority, referred with approval to th e law laid down in Rajnikant Jivanlal (supra) wherein it was observed as under:

The public prosecutor is expected to independently appl y his mind to the request of the investigating agency before submitting a report to the court for extension of time w ith a view to enable the investigating agency to complete the investigation. He is not merely a post oice or a forwarding agency. A public prosecutor may or may not agree with the reasons given by the investigating oicer for seeking extens ion of time and may ind that the investigation had not progre ssed in the proper manner or that there has been unnecessary, deliberate or avoidable delay in completing the investiga tion. In that event, he may not submit any report to the court under clause (bb) to seek extension of time. Thus, for seeking extension of time under clause (bb), the public prosecutor after a n independent application of his mind to the request of the investigating agency is required to make a report to the Designated Court indicating therein the progress of the investigation and disclosing justiication for keeping the acc used in further custody to enable the investigating agency to complete the investigation. The public prosecutor may attach the request of the investigating oicer along with his reque st or application and report, but his report, as envisaged unde r clause (bb), must disclose on the face of it that he has app lied his mind and was satisied with the progress of the investigation and considered grant of further time to complete the invest igation necessary. The use of the expression "on the report o f the public prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the speciic reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period" as occurring in clause (bb) in sub-section (2) of Sect ion 167 as amended by Section 20(4) are important and indicative of the legislative intent not to keep an accused in custody unreasonably and to grant extension only on the report of the public prosecutor. The report of the public prosecutor, therefore, is not merely a formality but a very vital report, beca use the consequence of its acceptance afects the liberty of a n accused and it must, therefore, strictly comply with the requirem ents as contained in clause (bb). The request of an investigating oi cer for extension of time is no substitute for the report of the public prosecutor. Where either no report as is envisaged by cl ause (bb)

is iled or the report iled by the public prosecutor is not Harish 17 of 22 904-APEAL-218-2026.doc accepted by the Designated Court, since the grant of ext ension of time under clause (bb) is neither a formality nor autom atic, the necessary corollary would be that an accused would be entitled to seek bail and the court 'shall' release him on bail if he furnishes bail as required by the Designated Court.”

14. In State of Maharashtra (supra), the Appeal was by the State against the order passed by the High Court setting aside the order passed by the Trial Court granting extension of time for inve stigation, on the ground that the mandatory requirement of the pro viso of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 43D of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 was not met. In that case, the irst report for extension of time for investigation was made by the Investigating Oicer and on the same day, another report was submitted by the Public Prosecutor. It was observed that “Undoubtedly the request of an IO for extension of time is not a substitute for the report of the Public Prosecutor but since we ind that there has been, as per the comparison of the two documents, an application of mind by the Public Prosecutor as well as an endorsement by him, the inirmities in the form should not entitle the respondents to the beneit of the default bail when in substance there has been an application of mind."

15. Coming to the case at hand, the Special Judge, MCOCA, Sangli has passed the following order, which is impugned in this Appeal.

“1. Accused No.1 Nilesh Gadade Accused No. 2 Kiran Shan kar Lokhande, accused No. 4 Sagar @ Nanaso Manik Chougule No. 5 Atul Dadaso Waydandé and No. 6 Sandesh @ Sandry Ramchandra Harish 18 of 22 904-APEAL-218-2026.doc Ghagare, Accused No. 8 Malik Shaikh, and Accused No. 9 Moh ammad Jamal Nadaf are produced on V.C. from concerned Jails, t here respective Advocates are present. I.O. and Additional P. P. present.

Learned additional P. P. iled report for extension of period of 90 days as per section 21(2)(b). Copy of application of served on accused in Jail.

Heard learned A.P.P., I. O. also heard advocates re presenting respective accused. Perused report. The ofence of registered on 12.06.2026. The extension is sought as absconding accused are to be traced, investigation in respective of bank detail and mon ey trails of syndicate activities are to be traced, permission for cha rge-sheet from competent authority is to be obtained. Considering the t hese reasons as well as previous investigation papers, I hold that extension is necessary.

Hence, the order.

ORDER

1. The extension of further period of the 90 days fro m 10.09.2026 is granted as prayed as per section 21(2)(b) of MCOC Act.”

16. The aforesaid impugned order is passed on the report/application by the Sub-Divisional Police Oicer, Miraj Division, Miraj dated 07th September, 2026. The copy of the said report is enclosed to the Appeal from page Nos. 125 to 142. Perusal of the same goes to sho w that, the Investigating Oicer gave the details of the crime, the investigation done, and the grounds for extension of time up to 90 d ays to carry out the investigation from 10 th September, 2026. The last page of the said report/application shows that, it was iled through the Special P.P. There is a signature under the words 'iled by', which appears to be made by the Special P.P. Whatever report/application was iled, upon which the impugned order came to be passed, was by the Investigating Oice r.

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The said application nowhere shows that it was the report as contemplated under the provisions of Section 21(2)(b) of MCOCA, which requires the report of the Public Prosecutor. There is n othing to show that, the Special P.P. applied his mind to the request made by the Investigating Oicer. The said report/application nowhere indicates that the Special P.P. was satisied with the request made by the Investigating Oicer for extension of time for investigation. Mere endorse ment 'iled by' and the signature below that, cannot be said that the said report/application fulilled the requirement of the aforesaid provision requiring submission of the report by the Public Prosecutor. The said report/application is sans independent consideration, application of mind and satisfaction of the Special P.P. Even the order impugned nowhere records the inding that, the report/application was submitted after application of mind and satisfaction of the Special P.P. From this, it is clear that, the impugned order was passed on the report/ap plication which did not fulill the requirement of law. Though there is no prescribed format for such report/application, as contended by the learned Special P.P., the aforesaid provision of Section 21 of the MCOCA and the law laid down in the aforesaid decisions mandates that , the report/application for extension of time to carry out the investigation should satisfy the aforesaid requirement under the law. The report/application iled by the Investigating Oicer, upon which the Harish 20 of 22 904-APEAL-218-2026.doc impugned order is passed, was merely iled through the learn ed Special P.P. with his signature. In these facts and circumstances of th e case and in the light of the above legal position, the impugned order is unsustainable in the eye of law and therefore needs to be interfered with.

17. As regards prayer clause (b) is concerned, it is submitted b y the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant that the Appel lant has already iled an application for bail before the learned Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge, (MCOCA Court), Sangli which the A ppellant would pursue and he would therefore not press prayer clause (b).

18. At this stage the learned Special P.P. submits that, the State wants to challenge this order before the Hon'ble Supre me Court and prays for stay for a period of four (4) weeks. The prayer is opposed by the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant. He submit th at, since this Court has allowed the Appeal, the right has accrued to the Appellant for default bail and the Appellant has iled the application before the learned Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge, (MCOCA Cou rt), Sangli and the stay will afect the Appellant’s right. This Court has considered the matter on merits. Considering the ground o n which the impugned order is quashed and set aside and as the full text o f this order would be ready today itself, the prayer made by the learned Special P.P. stands rejected. In view of the above, the following order:

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ORDER

i. The Criminal Appeal is allowed.

ii. The impugned order dated 8 th September, 2026 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge, (MCOCA Court), Sangli in Crime No. 235 of 2026 is quashed and set aside.

[Neeraj P. Dhote, J.] [Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.] Harish 22 of 22